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THE LIFE AND LEGACY OF CHIEF JUDGE COOKE

ARTICLES
THE LIFE AND LEGACY OF CHIEF JUDGE LAWRENCE H.
COOKE: “TRULY AN EXEMPLARY LIFE. A LIFE WELL LIVED”1
Jay C. Carlisle II*†
Anthony DiPietro**
INTRODUCTION
It is an appropriate tribute to the late Chief Judge of New York,
Lawrence H. Cooke, that this article be devoted to a man who many
leaders of the bench, bar, and academia consider to be the greatest
* Jay C. Carlisle II is one of the founding professors of Pace University School of Law. He is
a commissioner for the New York State Law Revision Commission, an elected Life Fellow of
the American Bar Foundation, and a referee for the New York State Commission on Judicial
Conduct. Mr. Carlisle is also senior counsel at Collier, Halpern, & Newberg, LLP.
† Chief Judge of New York Lawrence H. Cooke was my friend, mentor, and colleague for
twenty-five years. I was a member of his Task Force on Women and the Courts and one of
the drafters of the Task Force final report, which was featured on the front page of the New
York Times. After Chief Judge Cooke retired from the Court of Appeals in 1984, he practiced
law until Pace Law School hired him in 1989 as a distinguished professor of law. "Professor"
Cooke was on our faculty until 1992 and was consistently rated by our students as a superb
teacher.
The Chief was a member of the Court of Appeals for ten years. He made his mark both as
a jurist and administrator. The Chief was a diligent defender of human rights, writing many
opinions demonstrating his concern for the constitutional rights of defendants, free speech,
and the protection of persons against discrimination. His proudest success was bringing
court backlogs under control, disposing of 2.4 million cases in 1983, an increase of 500,000
from 1979. Chief Judge Cooke always followed the high road and did so with incredible
charm, humor, and decency. He passed away on August 17, 2000, at the age of 85, in
Monticello, New York. I continue to miss him and am grateful to the Albany Law Review for
publishing this article.
** Anthony DiPietro, Esq., is a criminal defense attorney representing individuals in
complex federal and state post-conviction litigation. Mr. DiPietro graduated from Pace
University School of Law, magna cum laude. His law office is located in White Plains, New
York. The authors wish to thank several former law students of Professor Carlisle’s
Advanced Civil Procedure course at Pace University School of Law (Spring 2013): Agatha
Rudz, Susan Carmichael, Britney Edwards, Janice Castro, and Jessica Yanefski, for their
help and contributions to this article.
1 Judith S. Kaye, In Memoriam: Lawrence H. Cooke: 1914-2000, 72 N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N J. 50,
51 (2000).
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jurist to ever serve on New York State's highest court. Chief Judge
Cooke, better known as Larry, served with honor and distinction as
an associate judge of the Court of Appeals, and later as Chief
Judge.2
Lawrence H. Cooke was a man “motivated by love—for his family,
for the law, for people and life in general.”3 He led a full and
meaningful life that exemplified fundamental virtues of peace,
integrity, and fairness.4 While growing up in Monticello, New York,
a town on the foothills of the Catskill Mountains, his parents taught
him that dedication and hard work was required in order to be
successful.5 His father, a former District Attorney for Sullivan
County, showed him that public servants must always “take the
high road”6 in their affairs and never be obligated to anyone.7
Chief Judge Cooke once wrote that he considered his father “the
personification of virtue. He was a man of common sense and
logic—with his feet always solidly on the ground.”8 Chief Judge
Cooke’s father’s teachings influenced his work ethic, which resulted
in him working up to eighteen hours per day to fulfill his judicial
duties.9 Chief Judge Cooke recognized that his time on the court
was a “sacred mission” in order to provide litigants a full and fair
process.10
In 1981, during a keynote address, Chief Judge Cooke stated:
“Justice is the great commodity.”11 He explained that leaders
should always be guided by principles of justice and equality. In
this regard, Chief Judge Cooke explained that great historical
leaders appreciated this concept, noting as an example that
Abraham Lincoln understood “the . . . important idea that the law
represented . . . the idea of fairness;” Thomas Jefferson “exalted the
Id. at 50.
Laurie Stuart, Editorial, Goodbye Judge Cooke, RIVER REP. (Aug. 24, 2000), http://www.
riverreporter.com/issues/00-08-24/editorial.htm.
4 Chief Judge Cooke sought justice throughout his judicial career in its purest form. See,
e.g., Anthony Kane et al., Tribute to Former Chief Judge Lawrence H. Cooke, 70 N.Y. ST. B. J.
46, 46 (1998).
5 See Kane et al., supra note 4, at 46.
6 Martha Middleton, Mr. Chief Activist, Cooke Is on a ‘Sacred Mission,’ 69 A.B.A. J. 431,
431 (1983).
7 Id. (“Justice [is] always the great virtue: all of us have a great duty to render justice and
fairness to our neighbors in everyday affairs.”).
8 Lawrence H. Cooke, Waste Not, Wait Not—A Consideration of Federal and State
Jurisdiction, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 895, 895 (1981).
9 See Middleton, supra note 6, at 431.
10 See id. (“When I lay down my head at night time or finally, I want to say I’ve done
everything I can.”).
11 Lawrence H. Cooke, Remarks of the Chief Judge of the State of New York, 2 PACE L. REV.
231, 243 (1982).
2
3
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concept of ‘equal and exact justice to all;’” and Frederick Douglass
observed that “[t]he lesson which the American people must learn
. . . is that equal manhood means equal rights.”12 Following this
approach himself, Chief Judge Cooke left a legacy defending equal
justice and fundamental fairness for all people.
I. BACKGROUND
At the age of twenty, Chief Judge Cooke graduated cum laude
from Georgetown University,13 and later received the John Carroll
Award.14 Upon graduating from Georgetown, Chief Judge Cooke
was accepted into Harvard Law School, where he began his legal
education.15 He later transferred and graduated from Albany Law
School.16 Chief Judge Cooke also received honorary LLB or LLD
degrees from Albany Law School, Union University, Siena College,
Brooklyn Law School, New York University, Pace University, and
Syracuse University.17
After graduating from Albany Law School, the Chief worked at
the law office of John Lyons, a well-known Sullivan Country trial
lawyer.18 In 1947, he became the Chairman of the Sullivan County
Board of Supervisors.19 After working for John Lyons, Chief Judge
Cooke went into private practice and in 1953, ran for County Court
Judge.20 A year later, Cooke was elected as Sullivan County Judge,
Surrogate and Children’s Court Judge.21 In 1961, Cooke was named
to the New York State Supreme Court, followed by an appointment
to the Appellate Division, Third Department, in 1969.22 He was
elected to the Court of Appeals as an associate judge in 1974,23 and
in 1979, was appointed Chief Judge.24 Chief Judge Cooke served on
New York’s highest court with novel admiration from his colleagues,
and is remembered as one of the most influential and celebrated

Id. at 243–44.
Kane et al., supra note 4, at 46.
14 Hon. Lawrence H. Cooke, TIMES HERALD-REC. (Aug. 19, 2000), http://choicesmhc.com/fil
es/monticello/history/cookethr.htm.
15 Kane et al., supra note 4, at 46.
16 See id.
17 Hon. Lawrence H. Cooke, supra note 14.
18 Kane et al., supra note 4, at 46.
19 Hon. Lawrence H. Cooke, supra note 14.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Kane et al., supra note 4, at 47.
23 Id.
24 Id.
12
13
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jurists.25
During his tenure on the bench, Chief Judge Cooke wrote many
instructive opinions on criminal law and procedure,26 New York
Practice, the right to free press, guardianship, and victim rights.27
The Chief authored significant opinions relating to the development
of the state’s independence and the progression of New York’s
Constitution.28 Chief Judge Cooke’s recognition of the state’s
judicial sovereignty allowed the state court to independently control
fundamental issues, including searches and seizures and procedural
due process rights.29 He was regarded as “a giant who helped
ensure that, while the United States Supreme Court changed
directions and its role, the New York Court of Appeals would
continue to be an independent force and a national leader in
safeguarding our rights and liberties.”30
According to Chief Judge Cooke, each decision he authored was
designed to provide sufficient notice and guidance to future
litigants. He explained that his rulings were:
[A] yardstick that you can use for conduct in the future, so
that when you pronounce a decision in a case, you can take
that yardstick and measure it into a future case, so people
know what they can do and what they have a right to do and

25 See, e.g., A Dedication to Chief Judge Lawrence H. Cooke, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 145, 145,
154 (1984) (providing a dedication from the editors themselves, as well as from others in the
legal community); see generally Hon. William J. Brennan, Jr., A Tribute of Chief Judge
Charles S. Desmond, 36 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 3 (1987) (recognizing the New York Court of Appeals
as a leader in state constitutionalism).
26 A Dedication to Chief Judge Lawrence H. Cooke, supra note 25, at 154 (“Perhaps the
area of the law where Chief Judge Cooke’s voice speaks most distinctly and compellingly is
that of the constitutional requirements in the criminal justice process.”).
27 Id. at 155 (“To list all the topics on which he has contributed authoritatively to the
growth of the law would be virtually to recapitulate the syllabus of [the legal] profession.”).
28 See, e.g., People v. P. J. Video Inc., 501 N.E.2d 556, 559–60 (N.Y. 1986) (“State courts are
bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court when reviewing federal statutes or applying the
federal Constitution. Under established principles of federalism, however, the states also
have sovereign powers. When their courts interpret state statutes or the state Constitution
the decisions of these courts are conclusive if not violative of federal law. Although state
courts may not circumscribe rights guaranteed by the federal Constitution, they may
interpret their own law to supplement or expand them.”).
29 See, e.g., People v. Skinner, 417 N.E.2d 501, 502 (N.Y. 1980) (holding that the right to
counsel attaches in a noncustodial setting once counsel has instructed the police not to
question the defendant in his absence); People v. Rogers, 397 N.E.2d 709, 710 (N.Y. 1979)
(holding that once an attorney has entered the proceeding, a defendant in custody may not be
questioned further in the absence of counsel); People v. Settles, 385 N.E.2d 612, 614 (N.Y.
1978) (holding that a defendant under indictment and in custody may not waive the right to
counsel unless the waiver is made in the presence of the defendant’s attorney).
30 Vincent Martin Bonventre, Judges on Judges: The New York State Court of Appeals
Judges’ Own Favorites in Court History, 71 ALB. L. REV. 1051, 1051 (2008).
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what they shouldn’t do.31
Distinguished Professor Vincent M. Bonventre of Albany Law
School explained that Chief Judge Cooke was a judicial giant, who
“led his colleagues on the court, and held the way for state supreme
courts throughout the nation to take their constitutional guarantees
seriously. Indeed, the body of his opinions is a veritable call to arms
to enforce fundamental law of the state in service of fundamental
freedoms.”32
While Chief Judge, Cooke also “served as Chairman of the
Conference of Chief Judges and became President of the National
Center for State Courts in 1982.”33 In 1986, President Reagan
appointed the Chief to chair the State Justice Institute.34 In 1987,
Chief Judge Cooke received the Distinguished Service Award from
the National Center for State Courts.35 In appreciation of his
service, the Sullivan County Courthouse was renamed the
Lawrence H. Cooke Sullivan County Courthouse.36 In the latter
part of his career, the Chief was also “of counsel to the Albany law
firm of Couch, White, Brenner and Feigenbaum[,] and served as a
member of the Board of Directors of the First National Bank of
Jeffersonville.”37
Chief Judge Cooke also utilized his status within the legal
community to advocate for reform and protection of women’s
rights.38 Notably, he advocated for changes to protect the rights of
rape victims, whom he had felt “[we]re outside the effective
protection of the law.”39 In addition, Chief Judge Cooke put into
effect a rule that prohibited reimbursement for expenses of business
transacted in facilities that discriminated on the grounds of gender
and race.40 While acting as Chief Judge, he also appointed a
twenty-three member panel, the Women in Law Task Force,41 to
Kathy Schofield Zdeb, The Chief, ALB. L. SCH. UNION U. MAG., Spring 1995, at 8.
Id. at 8–9.
33 See Hon. Lawrence H. Cooke, sup-ra note 14.
34 See Joyce Adolfsen & Lou Adolfsen, Lawrence Henry Cooke, HIST. SOC’Y N.Y. CTS.,
http://www.nycourts.gov/history/legal-history-new-york/history-legal-bench-courtappeals.html
?http://www.nycourts.gov/history/legal-history-new-york/luminaries-court-appeals/cooke-lawr
ence.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2017).
35 See Lawrence Henry Cooke: Lawyer, State Chief Judge, PRABOOK, http://prabook
.com/web/person-view.html?profileId=59287# (last visited Mar. 28, 2017).
36 Kane et al., supra note 4, at 48.
37 Hon. Lawrence H. Cooke, supra note 14.
38 Adolfsen & Adolfsen, supra note 34.
39 Id.
40 Robert B. McKay, Six Short Tears of Meritorious Service as Chief Judge, in A Dedication
to Chief Judge Lawrence H. Cooke, supra note 25, at 153.
41 At the time, a report by a special state task force that studied the courts for almost two
31
32
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research gender inequalities42 in the court system.43 In 1982, Chief
Judge Cooke was the only man to have ever been admitted as an
honorary member of the New York State Women’s Bar
Association.44
During his professional career, Chief Judge Cooke was also active
within his community. He served as President of the Monticello
Fire Department, Sullivan County Volunteer Firefighters
Association, and the Hudson Valley Volunteer Firefighters
Association.45 The Firemen’s Association of the State of New York
presented him with the Golden Trumpet Award.46 Chief Judge
Cooke was a member of St. Peter’s Roman Catholic Church, and
praised by many religious organizations for his outreach to the
community—receiving the Golda Meir Memorial Award from the
Jewish Lawyers Guild and the Torch of Liberty by B’nai B’rith.47
Chief Judge Cooke was also honored as the keynote speaker for the
International Jewish Jurists and Lawyers Convention in
Jerusalem.48
II. PROFESSOR OF LAW
Chief Judge Cooke will be remembered for his many contributions
to several law schools located in New York. Among his many
years concluded that bias against women in the New York State court system was so
pervasive that women were often denied equal justice. See Jeffrey Schmalz, Pervasive Sex
Bias Found in Courts, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 1986), http://www.nytimes.com/1986/04/20/nyregi
on/pervasive-sex-bias-found-in-courts.html (“The [twenty-three]-member panel—set up in
May 1984 by Lawrence H. Cooke, then the state’s Chief Judge—concluded that female
lawyers were ‘routinely’ demeaned and treated patronizingly by male judges and attorneys.
The panel also found that the credibility of female witnesses was sometimes questioned
because women were viewed by some judges as emotional and untrustworthy. Calling the
situation grave, the panel said some judges did not understand the nature of family violence
and blamed the victims for it.”).
42 Report of the New York Task Force on Women in the Courts, 15 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 15,
15 (1987) [hereinafter Women in the Courts Task Force] (“The New York Task Force on
Women in the Courts has concluded that gender bias against women litigants, attorneys and
court employees is a pervasive problem with grave consequences. Women are often denied
equal justice, equal treatment[,] and equal opportunity.”).
43 UNIFIED COURT SYS. OFFICE OF COURT ADMIN., SUMMARY REPORT: NEW YORK TASK
FORCE ON WOMEN IN THE COURTS 1 (Mar. 1986), http://www.nycourts.gov/ip/womeninthecourt
s/pdfs/ny-task-force-on-women-in-the-courts-summary.pdf (including information relating to
the Task Force’s objective, investigation, and findings); Women in the Courts Task Force,
supra note 42.
44 Tom Rue, Chief Judge Lawrence H. Cooke—“Justice is a Very Fragile Commodity,” River
Rep., April 24, 1995.
45 Hon. Lawrence H. Cooke, supra note 14.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id.
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contributions, the Chief served as a founding board member of two
publications produced by Albany Law School49 and taught at Pace
University School of Law from 1988 to 1991.50
During this time, he served as a mentor to law students and was
influential throughout their studies.51
Former Pace students
recalled that it was an honor to have the former Chief Judge of the
New York Court of Appeals as a professor: “Judge Cooke enhanced
Pace Law School’s reputation and enriched the lives of all who had
the privilege to have him as their teacher.”52
Likewise, many students at Albany Law were instructed by Chief
Judge Cooke’s guest lectures.53 He would routinely lecture classes
on various subjects, seeking to take an active and positive role in
the development and direction of law students.54
He spoke with the students, sharing his thoughts and
feelings, his vision and convictions, his hopes and
expectations for them and their chosen profession. He would
call upon them to “search for justice, to render justice, the
ennobling feature” of a career in the law—“to help the
community and rectify the wrongs that come your way and
to support those that need your help.”55
Despite his distinguished resume, students were most amazed by
Chief Judge Cooke’s humble approach. He reminded students that
he was just a “man.” The Chief taught students that they should
respect members of the bench, but never be afraid to speak and
advocate for their clients.56 One former student stated that Chief
Judge Cooke “was a truly humble man and humanized himself, and
gave us a different perspective as to who a Judge is. Every day,
when I am advocating a case at trial, or upon a motion/appeal, I
49 Vincent Martin Bonventre, Tribute to Chief Judge Lawrence H. Cooke, 64 ALB. L. REV. 1,
2 (2000) (noting that Chief Judge Cooke helped the Albany Law Review plan and inaugurate
its State Constitutional Commentary issue, and helped create the Government Law & Policy
Journal).
50 Rue, supra note 44.
51 In addition to teaching at Pace, Chief Judge Cooke also visited other law schools to
speak with students about law, life, and ethics. See Vincent Martin Bonventre, Professional
Responsibility, 43 SYRACUSE L. REV. 505, 521 (1992). Cooke was lauded as a model of
professional responsibility and recognized for his teaching that a lawyer should always
remember: “When in doubt take the high road.” Id. at 522.
52 Letter from Jacqueline Hatter, Esq., to Jay Carlisle, II, Professor of Law, Pace Law Sch.
(Aug. 29, 2012) (on file with author) (“Judge Cooke was a brilliant jurist and teacher, as well
as a kind and good-hearted person.”).
53 Bonventre, supra note 49, at 2.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Interview with Anthony Pirrotti, Jr., Esq. (2012).
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remember the life lesson he gave us.”57 Another former student
recalls Judge Cooke telling his class: “You must argue with a fire in
your belly!” when advocating for what is fair and just.58
Chief Judge Cooke always tried to influence his students to take
an active role in the legal community and to strive for selfbetterment as a legal practitioner.59 He instructed his students to
always be ethical and passionate about their work. He also offered
the advice that lawyers should avoid ethical problems and “when in
doubt take the high road.”60 Former students of Chief Judge Cooke
recounted that their “best memories of the class, however, relate[d]
not to Lawrence Cooke the jurist, but Lawrence Cooke the man.”61
Chief Judge Cooke’s admiration was so widespread that many
students at Pace even petitioned the dean of the law school upon
notice that he was retiring from teaching. The students sent
several hundred letters to the dean of the law school demanding
that all efforts be employed to keep Chief Judge Cooke.62 To his
students, his presence became an integral part to their legal
education and life.63
III. NEW YORK COURT REFORM
In the 1970s and 1980s, New York’s court system was considered
one of the most active and expensive systems in the world.64 By
1981, New York City’s Supreme Court had 22,796 indictments and
over 173,288 criminal defendants were arraigned on misdemeanor
charges, requiring 331,580 courtroom appearances to process felony
Id.
Letter from Steven Habiague, Esq., to Jay Carlisle, II, Professor of Law, Pace Law Sch.
(Sept. 2, 2012) (on file with author).
59 Interview with Joseph Ruhl, Esq. (2012) (“Judge Cooke’s photograph, which is a replica
of his portrait on display in the New York State Court of Appeals, is on the wall in my office
at Wilson Elser, with a personal handwritten note from Chief Judge Cooke. When I look at it,
I am reminded of the amazing person, who inspired me to strive to be an excellent lawyer and
colleague, and to be involved in activities for the betterment of the legal profession.”).
60 Bonventre, supra note 49, at 3.
61 Interview with Joseph Ruhl, Esq. (2012) (“Before the course began, I—as well as other
members of the seminar—received a large package in the student mail. The package was
from Chief Judge Cooke and contained the course book that he had purchased for the
students of the class at his own expense. It was a simple and generous gesture that has
stayed with me since that time. It was indicative of the type of person Judge Cooke was—
selfless and generous. I still have the course book in my reference library.”).
62 Bonventre, supra note 49, at 2.
63 Letter from Richard Baum, Esq., to Jay Carlisle, II, Professor of Law, Pace Law Sch.
(Aug. 16, 2012) (on file with author) (“He was a very scholarly [and] honorable man. He truly
believed in ethics and the honor and value of our profession.”).
64 Robert B. McKay, Six Short Years of Meritorious Service as Chief Judge, 53 FORDHAM L.
REV. 151, 152 (1984).
57
58
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defendants and 673,685 appearances to handle misdemeanors.65 In
1983, New York State handled more than 2,300,000 actions and
proceedings, and approximately 2,400,000 dispositions.66
Chief Judge Cooke found that the organization of the New York
court system was “a nightmare for court managers, [an]
inconvenience to judges, and much expense to the taxpayer. Most
importantly, the senseless hodgepodge is inefficient and causes
court delay.” 67 Chief Judge Cooke also found that the instability of
the court led to sentencing disparities throughout the state,
including disparate sanctions,68 divergent outcomes,69 and
controlling feudal “duchies.”70 He saw “that complacency and
indifference had undermined the effectiveness and fairness of the
state judicial system.”71 The large backlog of cases, the judges
coming to work late and leaving early, and the discrimination
against women and minorities in the courthouses were cries for help
from the judicial system that Chief Judge Cooke answered with
hard-hitting reforms.72
Chief Judge Cooke believed that a strong central administration
with uniform rules would provide the proper structure for an
effective court system. He expressed:
[T]he administrative function involves management of the
court system—equipping a court with all that is necessary
and helpful that it might perform its acts of adjudication
well. . . . It is not an arbitrary . . . exercise; rather it is use of
power authorized by the people to make courts more efficient
in satisfying society’s needs.73
In 1981, Chief Judge Cooke proposed a judicial rotation plan,
which would be “a concerted movement designed to achieve
improvement in the judicial structures and methods.”74 Using
section 26 and section 28 of Article VI of the New York State
Nicolas Pileggi, Judges at War, NEW YORKER, Apr. 19, 1982, at 19.
McKay, supra note 64, at 152.
67 Lawrence H. Cooke, Structural Reform of the Judicial System, in NEW YORK STATE
TODAY: POLITICS, GOVERNMENT, PUBLIC POLICY 161, 167 (Peter W. Colby ed., 1985).
68 See Cooke, supra note 11, at 245.
69 See id.
70 Cooke, supra note 67, at 163.
71 Sullivan County Historical Society History Maker Award 1998: The Hon. Lawrence H.
Cooke, SULLIVAN COUNTY HIST. SOC’Y (June 1, 1998), http://www.sullivancountyhisto
ry.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=61:lawrence-h-cooke&catid=47:histor
y-makers&Itemid=59 [hereinafter Sullivan County Award].
72 See Vincent Martin Bonventre, Tribute to Chief Judge Lawrence H. Cooke 1914-2000, 64
ALB. L. REV. 1, 1 (2000).
73 Cooke, supra note 67, at 168.
74 Id. at 162.
65
66
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Constitution (the “Administration Supervision of the Courts”), Chief
Judge Cooke designed a judicial rotation plan that assigned lower
court judges as temporary judges in supreme court throughout New
York.75 He believed that the availability of more judges would
alleviate the pressure of everyday court business and balance the
workload.76
In addition, Chief Judge Cooke announced that a new two-step
system would be instituted, requiring “all New York City Civil and
Criminal Court Judges . . . to be screened by a select committee . . .
to determine their qualification to sit as acting supreme court
justices.”77 Following the screening, “assignment to the higher
judicial posts would be made on a rotation basis from the lower
court judges recommended by the committee.”78
On September 21, 1981, the Office of Court Administration
announced that a new plan for the operation of the temporary
assignment to supreme court would be forthcoming in New York
City.79 In January 1982, Chief Judge Cooke’s plan went into effect,
and it initially faced criticism. Many critics felt that the reforms
implemented by Cooke were an extreme abuse of power, working to
reduce the judiciary’s independence and undermine the
appointment of qualified judges.80
On January 14, 1982, New York City District Attorney Robert
Morgenthau challenged Cooke’s plan and moved to enjoin him from
making any temporary judicial assignments to New York City’s
Supreme Court. Chief Judge Cooke defended his position, stating:
The citizens have voted and made up their minds. They
chose central administration and continue to support it. The
mandate is clear. The People want effective leadership. The
People want modern methods and techniques and were not
satisfied with the way things were. They want speedy trials.
. . . They don’t want one single case adjourned 113 times, or
the average number of appearances per criminal case in New
York City to be 15.2 times.81
The supreme court dismissed Morgenthau’s claim that
See Morgenthau v. Cooke, 436 N.E.2d 467, 468 (N.Y. 1982).
See Cooke, supra note 67, at 164−65.
77 Morgenthau, 436 N.E.2d at 468.
78 Id.
79 See id.
80 See Marcia Chamber, Bar Criticizes Plans to Rotate Acting Justices, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8,
1981), http://www.nytimes.com/1981/11/08/nyregion/bar-criticizes-plans-to-rotate-acting-justic
es.html.
81 Cooke, supra note 67, at 168.
75
76
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administrative regulations had not been followed by Chief Judge
Cooke in making temporary assignments.82 The court noted that
the “respondent [Cooke] possessed the requisite authority to place
[his] announced plan into operation.”83
Thereafter, Morgenthau successfully appealed the decision.84 The
appellate division ruled that the Chief Judge could not arbitrarily
truncate certain administrative policies regulating temporary
assignments.85 The court held that “there was no compliance
therewith prior to promulgation of the plan or at any time, and
therefore that plan of temporary assignment is without effect and
void in respect of the manner of promulgation.”86 The court
observed: “The history of constitutional enactments in America
teaches that every grant of power should ideally be hedged about by
checks and balances to protect the body politic from absolute
power.”87 Thus, the court required that Cooke’s plan be adopted
only after proper protocol, in which the Chief Judge, the
Administrative Board of the Courts, and the Court of Appeals, agree
and approve.88
Thereafter, Chief Judge Cooke appealed the appellate division’s
decision to the New York Court of Appeals, but was unsuccessful in
obtaining a favorable outcome.89 Despite his unsuccessful appeal,
Chief Judge Cooke’s envisioned reformation of the judiciary was
still influential. While the Court of Appeals may have rebuked the
Chief for not following the proper procedures to implement reform,
they did not hold the procedures he proposed substantively
unconstitutional.90
Instead, the court boosted the morale of
reformers and implicitly promoted their cause to seek change by
outlining the process needed for the proposed reform to be
enacted.91
Following the Morgenthau case, Chief Judge Cooke continued his
efforts to push reforms that would improve the judiciary and expand
Morgenthau ex rel People v. Cooke, 448 N.Y.S.2d 480, 482 (App. Div. 1982).
Id.
84 See id. at 481−82.
85 Id. at 486 (“[T]he new rotation plan of temporary assignment of judges of the courts of
the City of New York requires, as prerequisite to promulgation, the adoption of a standard
and administrative policy in respect of the same, as well as consultation theretofore by the
Chief Judge with the Administrative Board of the Courts and approval by the Court of
Appeals[.]”).
86 Id.
87 Id. at 484.
88 See id. at 486.
89 See Morgenthau v. Cooke, 436 N.E.2d 467, 476 (N.Y. 1982).
90 See id.
91 See id.
82
83
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“the areas of personal freedom and offered protection to those too
powerless to defend themselves.”92
He pushed for openness,
fairness, and efficiency within the court, noting that a Chief Judge
must be “somebody who will never forget that the courts belong to
the people . . . [and] who will be anxious to improve the court
system.”93
Chief Judge Cooke created equal opportunity offices to prevent
discrimination against women and minorities in the staffing of the
judicial system, as well as a Court Facilities Task Force that
assessed the conditions of the courthouses and instituted the use of
computers to facilitate recordkeeping.94 By the time Chief Judge
Cooke left office in 1984, the New York State court system had the
most advanced computer technology in the country.95 Chief Judge
Cooke was able to establish uniform court hours and vacations that
provided efficient time management for court personnel.96 He
transferred more than two hundred upstate judges who had lighter
workloads to New York City.97 Further, he was able to bring in
retired judges to aid in ruling on pretrial criminal motions, and he
established arbitration panels and community dispute resolution
centers to help resolve civil disputes.98 Under Chief Judge Cooke’s
leadership, the court system stabilized.99 His reforms resulted in a
twenty-one percent reduction in the backlog of cases,100 and he
continued to quell the backlogs over time—disposing of 2.4 million
cases in 1983 alone.101
Chief Judge Cooke also worked tirelessly with Judge Herbert B.
Evans and Judge Robert J. Sise, both of whom were chief
administrative judges for the Office of Court Administration, “to put
in place other judicial administration reforms.”102 Together, they
implemented:
[M]erit screening[s] of criminal and civil court judges in New
York City for temporary designation as acting supreme court
Sullivan County Award, supra note 71.
Geoffrey Taylor, Chief Judge Reforms Huge State Court System, POUGHKEEPSIE J., July
11, 1984, at 6.
94 See, e.g., Kane et al., supra note 4, at 47.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 A Tribute to Chief Judge Lawrence H. Cooke, 58 ALB. L. REV. 1, 3 (1994).
98 See W. Ward Reynoldson, To Chief Judge Cooke: Leader in Innovative Judicial
Administration, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 149, 150 (1984).
99 See McKay, supra note 64, at 152.
100 A Tribute to Chief Judge Lawrence H. Cooke, supra note 97, at 3.
101 McKay, supra note 64, at 152.
102 Id.
92
93
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justices; . . . reform[s] of the sheriff’s jury panel; utilization of
retired judges; significant improvement and broadening of
judicial education; and establishment of the nation’s first
state-court supervised mediation program.103
Remarkably, Chief Judge Cooke’s quest for court reform remained
with his successors after his retirement. His longtime friend,
neighbor, and distinguished colleague, Chief Judge Judith Kaye,
followed Chief Judge Cooke’s promotion of court reform. In a
symposium, entitled: “Judges on Judges: The New York State Court
of Appeals Judges’ Own Favorites in Court History,” Judge Kaye
chose to honor Chief Judge Cooke because of his efforts “[c]omitted
. . . to fairness in life[] and . . . jurisprudence.”104
IV. REPRESENTATIVE OPINIONS
A. Criminal Law and Procedure
Chief Judge Cooke wrote many leading opinions on criminal law
and procedure as both Chief Judge and associate judge for the New
York Court of Appeals.105 He was a zealous advocate of state
constitutionalism and was committed to protecting New York’s
judicial independence.106 His judicial opinions sought to ensure
judicial independence in the wake of an encroaching federal
system.107 Of significance, Chief Judge Cooke ensured that the
protections afforded to criminal defendants under New York’s
Constitution would stand independent of those provided by the
United States Constitution.108
103 Id.; see also Sullivan County Award, supra note 71 (“There was increased reliance on
mediation and arbitration to cut down on the number of court cases and judges who had to
retire because of age were enabled to continue service to the state as hearing officers.”)
(“Sheriff juries, notorious for allowing people with ‘clout’ to avoid jury service, were done
away with to increase the pool of potential jurors. A management program was instituted to
secure better treatment of jurors.”).
104 Judith S. Kaye, Judges on Judges: The New York State Court of Appeals Judges’ Own
Favorites in Court History: Chief Judge Lawrence H. Cooke, 71 ALB. L. REV. 1055, 1057
(2008).
105 See A Dedication to Chief Judge Lawrence H. Cooke, supra note 25, at 154.
106 See, e.g., id. at 155.
107 See id.
108 See, e.g., People v. Skinner, 417 N.E.2d 501, 502 (N.Y. 1980) (holding that a defendant’s
statements should be suppressed, despite a valid Miranda warning and subsequent waiver,
when the waiver was derived by police in a noncustodial interview of the defendant who
obtained counsel specifically on the matter under investigation and whose lawyer had
instructed the police not to question the defendant in his absence); People v. Cunningham,
400 N.E.2d 360, 361 (N.Y. 1980) (“[O]nce a suspect in custody requests the assistance of
counsel, he may not be questioned further in the absence of an attorney. . . . [A]n uncounseled
waiver of a constitutional right will not be deemed voluntary if it is made after the right to
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In addition, Chief Judge Cooke’s opinions were consistent and
evenhanded.109 He remained steadfast in his commitment to
protecting core principles, noting: “A defendant charged with the
most heinous of crimes is still entitled to the fundamental fairness
we conceive under the notion of due process.”110 He routinely
directed that overreaching government activity was not to be
tolerated, because “if not checked, [it was] certain to encourage
lawlessness and destroy cherished freedoms.”111
On several occasions, Chief Judge Cooke authored decisions
directing that a criminal defendant’s conviction be overturned based
upon a finding that the trial proceeding was unfair. For instance, in
People v. Whalen,112 the defendant was convicted of rape in the first
degree following a jury trial, at which he “proceeded on a ‘mistaken
identification’ defense, and sought to establish an alibi.”113 Chief
Judge Cooke reversed the defendant’s conviction as a result of the
prosecution’s improper conduct during its summation, where the
prosecutor had impermissibly sought to undermine the defendant’s
alibi evidence by characterizing it as a concoction that was recently
fabricated to ruse the jury.114 The prosecutor also misrepresented to
the jury that no notice of the defendant’s alibi was ever received by
the prosecution before trial, although the defendant had properly
served the prosecutor with notice of his alibi defense eight months
beforehand.115
Chief Judge Cooke observed that the prosecutor not only violated
ethical mandates when falsely representing what had occurred
regarding the defendant’s alibi notice, but also that the prosecutor’s
action “in itself violated the [Government’s] obligation to seek
justice, rather than conviction.”116 Chief Judge Cooke explained
counsel has been invoked.”); People v. Settles, 385 N.E.2d 612, 613 (N.Y. 1978) (holding that
identification of a criminal defendant made during a pre-arraignment corporeal viewing
should have been excluded where the defendant, in absence of counsel but after receipt of
Miranda warnings, orally waived his right to have an attorney present at the lineup).
109 See, e.g., People v. Isaacson, 378 N.E.2d 78, 85 (N.Y. 1978) (“No matter what the
defendant’s past record and present inclinations to criminality, or the depths to which he has
sunk in the estimation of society, certain police conduct to ensnare him into further crime is
not to be tolerated by an advanced society.” (quoting Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369,
382–83 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring))).
110 Isaacson, 378 N.E.2d at 85.
111 Id.; see also id. at 84 (“[The] court would be paying mere lip service to the principle of
due process if it sanctioned the continuance of a prosecution in the face of [improper and
reprehensible police conduct].”).
112 People v. Whalen, 451 N.E.2d 212 (N.Y. 1983).
113 Id. at 213.
114 Id. at 214.
115 Id. at 213, 215.
116 Id. at 215.
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that the prosecutor “made himself a witness before the jury,
expressly and falsely denying that notice had been given.”117 He
concluded that such behavior “was completely unjustified, going far
beyond any bounds of proper advocacy[,]”118 and that “[t]he
prosecutor’s conduct during summation was [so] improper and
prejudicial to defendant”119 that a new trial was required in the
interest of justice.120
In People v. Blyden,121 Chief Judge Cooke also decided that a new
trial was warranted when the trial court had denied a defendant’s
for-cause challenge on a juror who voiced hostility to racial
minorities during voir dire.122 He explained that the juror’s general
statements, claiming that he could put aside his feelings and
remain impartial towards the defendant, were insufficient to ensure
that defendant received a fair trial.123 Chief Judge Cooke observed:
“The costs to society and the criminal justice system of discharging
the juror are comparatively slight, while the costs in fairness to the
defendant and the general perception of fairness of not discharging
such a juror are great.”124 He emphasized that a juror must convey
an absolute ability to render an impartial verdict, and a “hollow
incantation, made without assurance or certitude, is not enough.”125
He explained: “Where there remain[ed] . . . doubt in the wake of
such statements, when considered in the context of the juror’s overall responses, the prospective juror should be discharged for
cause.”126 Chief Judge Cooke emphasized that a court cannot
simply turn away from a juror’s “hostility to racial minorities that
cast serious doubt on his ability to render an impartial verdict,”
especially when someone’s life and liberty are at stake.127

Id. at 215–16.
Id. at 216.
119 Id. at 215.
120 See id. at 216.
121 People v. Blyden, 432 N.E.2d 758 (N.Y. 1982).
122 Id. at 758. Chief Judge Cooke noted:
In determining whether the trial court erred in refusing to discharge the challenged
juror for cause, it is necessary to look first to CPL 270.20 (subd 1, par [b]), which
authorizes a challenge for cause where the juror “has a state of mind that is likely to
preclude him from rendering an impartial verdict based upon the evidence adduced at
the trial.”
Id. at 759.
123 See id. at 760–61.
124 Id. at 760.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 See id. at 761.
117
118
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B. Due Process Clause of The New York State Constitution
Chief Judge Cooke emphasized the court system’s duty to address
due process claims under the New York Constitution.128 He sought
to utilize New York’s Constitution in order to expand upon rights
afforded to both criminal defendants and civil litigants under the
U.S. Constitution.129 Chief Judge Cooke’s rulings have influenced
the decisions of his court successors, as explained in further detail
below.130
Chief Judge Cooke advanced the development of New York’s due
process clause when the court decided People v. Isaacson, a case in
which the police facilitated the cooperation of an informant by
physical abuse and deception.131 The police also instructed the
informant to request that the defendant bring drugs into New York
by claiming that the informant desperately needed money as a
result of financial difficulties.132 The informant was also instructed
to tell the defendant to bring more than one ounce of cocaine.133
Chief Judge Cooke reversed the defendant’s conviction, finding
that the police’s conduct was not tenable in a system
constitutionally bound to accord defendants due process. Chief
Judge Cooke constructed a four-factor test in addressing claims
involving such police misconduct:
(1) [W]hether the police manufactured a crime which
otherwise would not likely have occurred, or merely involved
themselves in an ongoing criminal activity; (2) whether the
police themselves engaged in criminal or improper conduct
repugnant to a sense of justice; (3) whether the defendant’s
reluctance to commit the crime is overcome by appeals to
humanitarian instincts such as sympathy or past friendship,
by temptation of exorbitant gain, or by persistent solicitation
128 See People v. Gokey, 457 N.E.2d 723, 724–25 (N.Y. 1983) (holding that the New York
State Constitution affords individuals a greater right of privacy than does the United States
Constitution).
129 See, e.g., People v. Ferber, 441 N.E.2d 1100, 1101 (N.Y. 1982).
130 See, e.g., People v. Davis, 553 N.E.2d 1008, 1010–11 (N.Y. 1990) (“In New York, the
right to counsel is grounded on this state’s constitutional and statutory guarantees of the
privilege against self-incrimination, [and] the right to the assistance of counsel and due
process of law. . . . It extends well beyond the right to counsel afforded by the Sixth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and other state Constitutions.”).
131 People v. Isaacson, 378 N.E.2d 78, 80, 81 (N.Y. 1978).
The police had beaten and
deceived its informant into thinking that he was facing a stiff prison sentence, which caused
him to seek out the defendant. Id. at 81.
132 See id. at 80 (showing that the court found that police instructed the informant to tell
the defendant he was in trouble with the police and needed money to secure a lawyer).
133 See id.
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in the face of unwillingness; and (4) whether the record
reveals simply a desire to obtain a conviction with no reading
that the police motive is to prevent further crime or protect
the populace.134
Under this approach, Chief Judge Cooke found that the facts in
Isaacson:
[E]xposes the ugliness of police brutality, upon which was
imposed a cunning subterfuge employed to enlist the services
of an informant who, deceived into thinking he was facing a
stiff prison sentence, desperately sought out any individual
he could to satisfy the police thirst for a conviction, even of a
resident of another state possessed of no intention to enter
our confines.135
Chief Judge Cooke directed that “[n]o matter what the
defendant’s past record and present inclinations to criminality, or
the depths to which he has sunk in the estimation of society, certain
police conduct to ensnare him into further crime is not to be
tolerated by an advanced society.”136 He further held that the police
actions were so outrageous that a dismissal of the indictment was
warranted.137 In doing so, Chief Judge Cooke commanded that the
state’s due process clause guarantee respect for personal
immunities that were “so rooted in the traditions and conscience of
our people as to be ranked as fundamental.”138 Chief Judge Cooke
observed that he had a duty to foster “fundamental fairness . . . to
the very concept of justice,”139 and that the “court would be paying
mere lip service to the principle of due process if it sanctioned the
continuance of a prosecution in the face of the revelations of this
record.”140 Many other courts in the United States, including the
supreme courts of Florida and Minnesota, adopted the Chief Judge’s
four-factor approach in Isaacson when faced with similar
allegations of outrageous government conduct.141
See id. at 83.
See id. at 84.
136 See id. at 85. Chief Judge Cooke further expressed:
Those who fear that dismissal of convictions on due process grounds may portend an
unmanageable subjectivity. Such apprehension is unjustified for courts by their very
nature are constantly called upon to make judgments and, though differences of opinion
often surround human institutions, this is the nature of the judicial process.
Id.
137 Id. at 85.
138 Id. at 82 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
139 Isaacson, 378 N.E.2d at 82 (quoting People v. Leyra, 98 N.E.2d 553, 559 (1997)).
140 Isaacson, 378 N.E.2d at 84.
141 See, e.g., State v. Hunter, 586 So. 2d 319, 326 (Fla. 1991) (“[T]he majority opinion
134
135
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In People ex rel. McGee v. Walters,142 Chief Judge Cooke also
found that the due process clause of the New York State
Constitution mandates that the accused be allowed to confront
adverse witnesses in parole hearings.143 Cooke observed that a
parolee must be extended the same amenities as other citizens
when seeking to impeach adverse statements offered at a parole
revocation hearing, and such due process protections should not be
narrowly tailored based upon the adversarial setting.144
He
explained that “[a]ny determination that dispenses with the need
for confrontation requires consideration of the rights’ favored
status, the nature of the evidence at issue, the potential utility of
cross-examination in the fact-finding process, and the state’s burden
in being required to produce the declarant.”145
Twenty-seven years later, New York courts continued to follow
the Chief Judge’s rationale. In 2011, the New York Appellate
Division, Second Department, relied extensively upon his decision
in McGee, holding that a parolee’s due process rights were violated
when he was not afforded an opportunity to cross-examine his
parole officer, who prepared a report and possessed personal
knowledge of the alleged violations, during his revocation
hearing.146 The appellate division reaffirmed Chief Judge Cooke’s
finding that “a parolee has due process and statutory rights to
confront adverse witnesses whose statements are offered at a parole
issued today is in general harmony with the principles announced by the New York court.
Clearly, Florida’s own due process, objective entrapment defense would prohibit similar
conduct on the part of police and their informants in this state.”); State v. Jensen, No. T9-024518, 2004 WL 193133, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004) (“When a defendant raises a due[ ]process
issue on appeal relating to a drug crime, this court applies the four-factor test in People v.
Isaacson.”); State v. Theis, No. Co-93-1990, 1994 WL 396359, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (“In
making this determination of [police] outrageousness, this court depends on People v.
Isaacson.”).
142 People ex rel. McGee v. Walters, 465 N.E.2d 342 (N.Y. 1984).
143 See id. at 343. In People ex rel. McGee, Chief Judge Cooke affirmed the lower court’s
decision that found that an impingement upon a parolee’s right to cross-examine the author
of status reports was violative of his due process rights, and such a violation could not be
excused by entering the report as a business record. See id. at 343–44; see also Isaacson, 378
N.E.2d at 82 (“‘[D]ue process,’ unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a
fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances. It embraces fundamental rights
and immutable principles of justice and use of the term is but another way of saying that
every person’s right to life, liberty and property is to be accorded the shield of inherent and
fundamental principles of justice.”).
144 See Walters, 65 N.E.2d at 343.
145 Id.
146 See People ex rel. Rosenfield v. Sposato, 928 N.Y.S.2d 350, 351–52 (App. Div. 2011). In
Sposato, the court granted a writ of habeas corpus, finding that the petitioner’s due process
rights were violated when he was afforded no opportunity to cross-examine a parole officer
who prepared a report and who possessed personal knowledge of the alleged violations during
his parole hearing.

THE LIFE AND LEGACY OF CHIEF JUDGE COOKE

2016/2017]

The Life and Legacy of Chief Judge Cooke

1251

revocation hearing.”147
Furthermore, in Matter of Quinton A.,148 Chief Judge Cooke
addressed legislative enactments that provided mandatory
placements on juvenile offenders under the state’s due process
clause.149 The petitioner, a juvenile delinquent, argued that the
mandatory nature of his restrictive placement denied him due
process and equal protection of the law.150
Specifically, the
defendant challenged sections 743, 746, and 753 of the Family
Court Act, which allowed restrictive placements for those juveniles
found to have committed a designated felony act.151 Chief Judge
Cooke rejected the defendant’s claim that mandatory placement in
itself was unconstitutional, noting that “[t]he essence of procedural
due process is that a person must be afforded notice and an
opportunity to be heard before government may deprive him of
liberty or a recognized property interest.”152 Chief Judge Cooke
recognized that “restrictive placement is a deprivation of liberty
which the state may not accomplish without first affording
appellant due process of law.”153 However, he explained that
“[s]ince family court may not order restrictive placement until after
it affords a juvenile a statutorily required dispositional hearing on
notice, the statute fully comport[ed] with procedural due process
strictures.”154
Id. (quoting Walters, 465 N.E.2d at 343).
In re Quinton A., 402 N.E.2d 126 (N.Y. 1980).
149 See id. at 129. In Matter of Quinton A., the petitioner was a juvenile delinquent who
was found to have committed acts, which if committed by an adult, would have constituted
felony crimes. Id. On appeal, the petitioner maintained that the mandatory nature of his
restrictive placement denied him due process and equal protection of the law. Id. Chief
Judge Cooke reversed and remitted the matter for a new hearing, holding that the Family
Court Act “which provides for mandatory restrictive placement of the state’s most violent
juvenile offenders, is constitutional.” Id. at 128. However, the court concluded that it was
reversible error for the family court to admit inculpating statements made by petitioner and
his alleged accomplice expressly stating that the accomplice’s detailed statement could be
used to supply critical details absent from petitioner’s statement. See id. at 132.
150 See id. at 129.
151 Id. at 130 n.1.
152 Id.
Nevertheless, Chief Judge Cooke remanded the matter for a new hearing. He
concluded that it was error for the family court to have admitted certain inculpating
statements. See id. at 132.
153 Id. at 130.
154 Id. at 130 n.1. Chief Judge Cooke noted:
[R]estrictive placement is a deprivation of liberty which the state may not accomplish
without first affording appellant due process of law. But given a finding beyond a
reasonable doubt, that appellant committed acts which would have been felonious if
committed by an adult, appellant’s liberty interest has been diminished to the point
where utilization of a rehabilitative program requiring restrictive placement is not
violative of due process unless the selection of that program lacks a rational basis or its
application constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Thus, the notion that, in the
147
148
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Chief Judge Cooke also rendered significant opinions relating to
property rights under the due process clause of the New York State
Constitution.155 He issued a seminal opinion in Sharrock v. Dell
Buick-Cadillac, holding that sections of New York’s Lien Law,
which authorized a garageman to foreclose his possessory lien for
repairs and storage charges, were violative of New York’s
Constitution.156 Chief Judge Cooke commanded that the state’s due
process clause required that a person be given notice and an
opportunity to be heard before the state can allow the deprivation of
a significant property interest.157 He observed that “‘when no more
than private gain is directly at stake,’ the opportunity to be heard is
an indispensable bulwark against an arbitrary, and final,
deprivation of property.”158 He declared that the purpose of the due
process clause in the New York Constitution is to ensure that:
[N]o member of the state [is] disfranchised, or deprived of
any of his rights and privileges, unless the matter be
adjudged against him upon trial and according to the course
of the common law. It must be ascertained judicially that he
has forfeited his privileges, or that some one [sic] else has a
superior title to the property he possesses, before either of
them can be taken from him.159
Chief Judge Cooke rested his decision solely upon the due process
clause of the New York State Constitution, given that the federal
Constitution did not require such protections.160 He observed that
the “historical differences between the federal and state due process
clauses make clear that they were adopted to combat entirely
different evils.”161 He explained that prior to the Fourteenth
Amendment, the federal due process clause offered “virtually no
protections of individual liberties,” while “state Constitutions in
general, and the New York Constitution in particular, have long
safeguarded any threat to individual liberties.”162 He noted that
post[-]adjudicative stage, therapeutic treatment in the least restrictive setting is the
cornerstone for an adjudication of juvenile delinquency is rejected.
Id. at 130 (internal citations omitted).
155 See, e.g., Sharrock v. Dell Buick-Cadillac, Inc., 379 N.E.2d 1169, 1178 (N.Y. 1978).
156 See id. at 1171, 1177–78.
157 Id. at 1176.
158 Id. at 1178 (holding that sections of New York’s Lien Law, which authorized a
garageman to foreclose his possessory lien for repairs and storage charges, violated New
York’s Constitution).
159 Id. at 1174.
160 See id. at 1173 n.2.
161 Id. at 1174.
162 Id.; see also People v. Settles, 385 N.E.2d 612, 615 (N.Y. 1978) (expressing that the New
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“independent construction finds its genesis specifically in the
unique language of the due process clause of the New York
Constitution, as well as the long history of due process protections
afforded the citizens of this state and, more generally, in
fundamental principles of federalism.”163
Chief Judge Cooke explained the inherent differences between the
due process clause of the federal Constitution and the due process
clause in New York’s Constitution, noting: “Conspicuously absent
from the state Constitution is any language requiring state action
before an individual may find refuge in its protections.”164 He
proposed that the absence of an expressive direction, however, was
held not to eliminate the necessity of state involvement but “[to]
provide a basis to apply a more flexible state involvement
requirement than is currently being imposed by the Supreme Court
with respect to the federal provision.”165 Chief Judge Cooke
York State Constitution provided a basis for the right to counsel well before the Supreme
Court recognized comparable rights federally); People v. Staley, 41 364 N.E.2d 1111, 1113
(N.Y. 1977) (“[The New York courts] recognized that unreasonable delay in prosecuting a
defendant constitutes a denial of due process of law.” (citing People v. Winfrey, 228 N.E.2d
808, 812 (N.Y. 1967); People v. Wilson, 171 N.E.2d 310, 312–13 (N.Y. 1960))).
163 Sharrock, 379 N.E.2d at 1173. As a result, the Second Department held that the very
provision of the Uniform Commercial Code that had been upheld as constitutional by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Flagg Bros. v. Brooks was unconstitutional under the provisions of the New
York State Constitution. See Svendsen v. Smith’s Moving & Trucking Co., 431 N.Y.S.2d 94,
95, 96 (App. Div. 1980). The court found that the provision violated the due process clause of
the state Constitution as it was construed and applied in Sharrock. See id. In rendering its
per curiam decision, the Second Department said: “As in Sharrock . . . , the state’s
authorization of ex parte foreclosure of the warehouseman’s lien is violative of state due
process as it deprives debtors of a significant property interest without a prior opportunity to
be heard.” Id. at 96.
164 Sharrock, 379 N.E.2d at 1173. Chief Judge Cooke’s well-reasoned approach “did not
leave the barn door unlocked” in the face of three dissenting judges who advanced that the
provisions of the state and federal due process clause should be held co-extensive. See, e.g.,
id. at 1179–80, 1181 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
165 Id. at 1174; see also People v. P.J. Video, Inc., 501 N.E.2d 556, 560 (N.Y. 1986) (“One
basis for relying on the state Constitution arises from an interpretive review of its provisions.
If the language of the state Constitution differs from that of its federal counterpart, then the
court may conclude that there is a basis for a different interpretation of it. Such an analysis
considers whether the textual language of the state Constitution specifically recognizes rights
not enumerated in the federal Constitution; whether language in the state Constitution is
sufficiently unique to support a broader interpretation of the individual right under state law;
whether the history of the adoption of the text reveals an intention to make the state
provision coextensive with, or broader than, the parallel federal provision; and whether the
very structure and purpose of the state Constitution serves to expressly affirm certain rights
rather than merely restrain the sovereign power of the state. To contrast, noninterpretive
review proceeds from a judicial perception of sound policy, justice and fundamental fairness.
A noninterpretive analysis attempts to discover, for example, any preexisting state statutory
or common law defining the scope of the individual right in question; the history and
traditions of the state in its protection of the individual right; any identification of the right in
the state Constitution as being one of peculiar state or local concern; and any distinctive
attitudes of the state citizenry toward the definition, scope or protection of the individual
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explained that although certain acts may not constitute state action
under the federal Constitution for purposes of establishing a due
process violation, it could nevertheless constitute state action under
the New York State Constitution.166
Chief Judge Cooke’s opinion in Sharrock significantly impacted
the
courts’
subsequent
decisions
regarding
state
constitutionalism.167 For example, the U.S. Supreme Court in Jones
v. United States168 held that “the Eighth Amendment does not
require that the jurors be instructed as to the consequence of their
failure to agree.”169 Relying upon Chief Judge Cooke’s instruction in
Sharrock, the New York Court of Appeals rejected the Supreme
Court’s approach and reaffirmed that the due process clause of the
New York Constitution required a higher standard of fairness than
the federal Constitution.170 The court explained: “[O]n innumerable
occasions this court has given [the] state Constitution an
independent construction, affording the rights and liberties of the
citizens of this state even more protection than may be secured
under the United States Constitution.”171 Following this rationale,
the court found, irrespective of the holding in Jones, that a trial
court’s failure to give a proper deadlock instruction in the course of
a capital proceeding violated New York’s due process clause.172
C. Right to Counsel
Chief Judge Cooke wrote many significant judicial opinions
relating to a criminal defendant’s right to counsel. His opinions
stressed the importance of protecting a criminal defendant’s right to
counsel at all stages of a criminal matter, and the court’s duty to
advance state law when questions arose concerning the nature and
scope of the attorney-client relationship.173
right.”).
166 Sharrock, 379 N.E.2d at 1173.
167 See, e.g., P.J. Video, Inc., 501 N.E.2d at 561 (“In the past we have frequently applied
the state Constitution, in both civil and criminal matters, to define a broader scope of
protection than that accorded by the federal Constitution in cases concerning individual
rights and liberties.”).
168 Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373 (1999).
169 Id. at 381.
170 See People v. LaValle, 817 N.E.2d 341, 366 (N.Y. 2004).
171 Sharrock, 379 N.E.2d at 1173. “[H]istorical differences between the federal and state
due process clauses make clear that they were adopted to combat entirely different evils.”
LaValle, 817 N.E.2d at 366 (citing Sharrock, 379 N.E.2d at 1173).
172 LaValle, 817 N.E.2d at 366.
173 See, e.g., People v. Settles, 385 N.E.2d 612, 615 (N.Y. 1978) (“[S]o valued is the right to
counsel in this state, it has developed independent of its federal counterpart.”).
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In this context, Chief Judge Cooke routinely observed that
protecting the right to counsel was of crucial importance to
maintaining fundamental fairness in criminal proceedings, and he
understood counsel’s role as an important part to balance the
playing field in an adversarial settings in which the state is a
party.174 In this regard, Chief Judge Cooke explained:
[A] special solicitude for this fundamental right [to counsel]
is based upon our belief that the presence of an attorney is
the most effective means [the court has] of minimizing the
disadvantage at which an accused is placed when he is
directly confronted with the awesome law enforcement
machinery possessed by the state.175
Chief Judge Cooke’s opinions also established broader protections
for a criminal defendant’s right to counsel when such individuals
were first subjected to law enforcement questioning and requested
to waive their right to counsel.176 He found that the protections
offered by Miranda warnings might not always be sufficient to:
[E]nsure that an accused will not “waive” an important
constitutional right out of ignorance, confusion or fear, [so
the Court has held] that, in certain situations, the right to
counsel in New York includes the right of an accused to have
an attorney present while he is considering whether to waive
his rights.177
In this context, Chief Judge Cooke found that both an explicit and
implicit request for counsel by a defendant should not be narrowly
construed by law enforcement.178 For example, in People v. Buxton,
174 See, e.g., People v. Skinner, 417 N.E.2d 501, 503 (N.Y. 1980). In Skinner, Chief Judge
Cooke noted that an effective waiver of the right to counsel in the absence of a suspect’s
attorney “simply recognizes the right and need of an individual to have a competent advocate
at his or her side in dealing with the State.” Id.
175 People v. Cunningham, 400 N.E.2d 360, 363 (N.Y. 1980).
176 See, e.g., People v. Buxton, 374 N.E.2d 384, 387 (N.Y. 1978). In Buxton, Chief Judge
Cooke focused on the period of time that lapsed from the point in which the defendant was
apprehended and when the police sought a waiver from the defendant. Because the
defendant requested counsel “at the time of his arrest,” the court held that upon returning to
police headquarters, “the police may not immediately and actively seek a waiver of this right
and then proceed to interrogate [a defendant] in the absence of counsel.” Id.
177 Cunningham, 400 N.E.2d at 363.
178 People v. Kazmarick, 420 N.E.2d 45, 50 (N.Y. 1981) (Cooke, J., dissenting)
(“[C]ommencement of the criminal proceeding is the equivalent of actual representation by
counsel . . . [and] ‘where an indictment has been returned, [the court] equate[s] the indictment
with the entry of a lawyer into the proceedings and invoke[s] the requirement of counsel’s
presence to effectuate a valid waiver.’”); Settles, 385 N.E.2d at 617 (“The right to counsel is
not dependent upon the speed with which an attorney can be retained nor does it pivot on the
length of police delay in arraigning an indigent defendant so that counsel may be
appointed.”).
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Cooke demanded that a defendant’s indirect request for counsel was
sufficient to require counsel’s presence during police questioning.179
Chief Judge Cooke rejected the state’s contention that a “specific
and clear request to interrogating officers that [the] defendant did
not wish to speak with them” was required for the attachment of
counsel.180 He expressed that such a narrow tailoring of one’s right
to counsel would violate the defendant’s constitutional rights181 and
pervert the notion of fundamental fairness.182
In People v. Rogers, Chief Judge Cooke also found that law
enforcement officials may not purposely disregard counsel’s
“instruct[ion] . . . to cease further questioning,” even if counsel is
retained by the defendant on an unrelated charge.183 He expressed

179 See, e.g., Buxton, 374 N.E.2d at 386–87. In Buxton, the defendant had requested that a
third party obtain a lawyer for him while police apprehended him from his place of
employment. Id. at 386. The defendant was taken to police headquarters where he was read
his Miranda rights and notified of the charges brought against him. Id. The defendant was
held in police custody for approximately two hours before witnesses were brought to the
station to view the defendant, during which time he repeatedly requested assistance of
counsel. Id. Subsequently, the defendant was questioned by the police and offered
statements regarding the crimes with which he was charged. Id. The state argued that
because the request was made to a third party, it was not a sufficiently “specific and clear
request to interrogating officers that [the] defendant did not wish to speak with them until he
had consulted with an attorney.” Id.; see also People v. Bevilacqua, 382 N.E.2d 1326, 1329
(N.Y. 1978) (concluding that a violation of the right to counsel occurred in light of a bad-faith
failure by police to notify the mother of an eighteen-year-old suspect who requested her
mom’s assistance, and subsequently concealed the defendant’s location from her and the
attorney she retained).
180 Buxton, 374 N.E.2d at 386. The court noted that “it would be an absurd formality” to
conclude that the defendant’s request for representation was not valid because although
made in the presence of the police, the request was directed at a third-party. Id.
181 Id. at 386–87. Chief Judge Cooke noted that a statement “freely and voluntarily” given
by the defendant to the police “without any compelling influence is . . . admissible in
evidence.” Id. at 387. However, a defendant, after asserting the right to remain silent, may
subsequently be questioned and those statements admitted into evidence as long as
additional Miranda warnings are given and “the subsequent statement is not the product of
‘continued importunity or coercive interrogation in the guise of a request for reconsideration.’”
Id. (quoting People v. Gary, 286 N.E.2d 263, 264 (N.Y. 1972)). Although a defendant’s specific
request for counsel renders further police interrogation improper, a statement made by the
defendant may nonetheless be admitted in evidence if the statement is “a spontaneous
admission or [the defendant] simply change[s] his mind and voluntarily make[s] a statement.”
Buxton, 374 N.E.2d at 387.
182 See Buxton, 374 N.E.2d at 386.
183 People v. Rogers, 397 N.E.2d 709, 711, 713 (N.Y. 1979). In Rogers, the defendant was
taken to police headquarters upon an arrest for a robbery. Id. at 711. During his arrest, the
defendant was twice read his Miranda rights—once at the time of arrest and again prior to
questioning at the police station. Id. During custodial questioning, the defendant alerted the
police that he was represented by counsel, but agreed to interrogation without his attorney
present. Id. At this time, the defendant’s attorney had contacted police headquarters and
demanded that the questioning of his client cease. Id. Ignoring this request, the officers
continued the interrogation, claiming that the defendant waived his right to have counsel
present. Id.
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that a waiver of the defendant’s right to counsel in the absence of
his attorney is not a constitutionally valid waiver,184 and the state’s
failure to adhere to this approach would present severe
ramifications.185
In Rogers, the defendant had been taken to police headquarters
after being arrested for robbery.186 At the time of his arrest, the
defendant was twice read his Miranda rights.187 During custodial
questioning, the defendant alerted the police that he was
represented by counsel, but agreed to interrogation without his
attorney present.188 At this time, the defendant’s attorney had
contacted police headquarters asking that the defendant not be
questioned.189 The officers ignored counsel’s request, and continued
the interrogation, asking about unrelated activities, relying upon
the defendant’s prior waiver.190
Chief Judge Cooke rejected the government’s contention that the
defendant’s waiver was sufficient.191 He explained that “it is the
role of defendant’s attorney, not the state, to determine whether a
particular matter will or will not touch upon the extant charge.”192
He also emphasized:
[I]t would be to ignore reality to deny the role of counsel
when the particular episode of questioning does not concern
the pending charge[, and it] cannot be assumed that an
attorney would abandon his client merely because the police
represent that they seek to question on a matter unrelated to
the charge on which the attorney has been retained or
assigned.193
Chief Judge Cooke’s opinion in Rogers has remained influential
and is controlling authority.194 For over three decades, “[it] has
See id. at 713.
See id. at 710–11 (noting that a violation of counsel’s command to police that
questioning cease could lead to an exclusion of statements and/or a new trial if improperly
admitted).
186 See id. at 711.
187 See id.
188 See id.
189 See id.
190 See id.
191 See id. at 711–12.
192 Id. at 713; People v. Lopez, 947 N.E.2d 1155, 1160 (N.Y. 2011) (“The Rogers rule is
eminently straightforward: when an attorney undertakes representation in a matter for
which the defendant is in custody, all questioning is barred unless the police obtain a
counseled waiver.
Rogers therefore requires inquiry on three objectively verifiable
elements—custody, representation[,] and entry.”).
193 Rogers, 397 N.E.2d at 713.
194 See Lopez, 947 N.E.2d at 1158–59.
184
185
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stood as a workable, comprehensible, bright line rule, providing
effective guidance to law enforcement while ensuring that it is
defendant’s attorney, not the police, who determines which matters
are related and unrelated to the subject of the representation.”195
To date, the courts have expressed the utmost praise for Chief
Judge Cooke’s approach in Rogers,196 and have continuously
disapproved of any attempt to undercut its application.197 In 2011,
the New York Court of Appeals continued to expressively adopt the
holding of Rogers.198
Chief Judge Cooke also held in People v. Settles that “[t]he filing
of an indictment constitutes the commencement of a formal judicial
action against the defendant and is equated with the entry of an
attorney into the proceeding.”199 In Settles, the police had issued a
195 Id. at 1160 (citing People v. Burdo, 690 N.E.2d 854, 856 (N.Y. 1997)). In Lopez, the
police interrogated the defendant relating to a murder case while he was already incarcerated
in Pennsylvania on other charges, upon which counsel was attained. See Lopez, 947 N.E.2d
at 1157. An informant had told the New York police that the defendant was involved in the
robbery and was the individual who shot the victim. See id. at 1156. Acting on this tip, a
New York police officer visited the defendant at the Pennsylvania prison to continue the
investigation. Id. at 1157. Upon arrival at the prison, the detective read the defendant his
Miranda rights, but did not inquire as to whether the defendant was represented by counsel.
Id. Rather than directly asking the defendant whether he had representation, the police
officer sought to obtain the defendant’s consent to continue, asking only whether the
defendant would like to speak with an attorney before proceeding with his interrogation. See
id. During the course of questioning, the defendant confessed to being involved in the crime,
but denied that he was the shooter. See id. Finding a violation of the defendant’s indelible
right to counsel, the court relied upon the holding in Rogers, finding that “the indelible right
to counsel activates the moment that an attorney becomes involved.” Id. at 1159.
196 See generally Rogers, 397 N.E.2d at 713 (showing the standard). In this regard, New
York’s jurisprudence “has continuously evolved with the ultimate goal of ‘achieving a balance
between the competing interests of society in the protection of cherished individual rights, on
the one hand, and in effective law enforcement and investigation of crime, on the other.’”
People v. Grice, 794 N.E.2d 9, 12 (N.Y. 2003) (quoting People v. Waterman, 175 N.E.2d 445,
447 (N.Y. 1961). Consequently, the parameters of the indelible right to counsel are defined
“through the adoption of ‘pragmatic and . . . simple[] test[s]’ grounded on ‘common sense and
fairness’” in order to “provid[e] an objective measure to guide law enforcement officials and
the courts.” See Grice, 794 N.E.2d at 12; People v. Robles, 533 N.E.2d 240, 245 (N.Y. 1988).
197 See, e.g., Lopez, 947 N.E.2d at 1160 (“Permitting a police officer to remain deliberately
indifferent—avoiding any inquiry on the subject notwithstanding the nature of the custodial
charges and the likelihood that a lawyer has entered the matter—in order to circumvent the
protection afforded by Rogers is not only fundamentally unfair to the rights of the accused, it
further undermines the preexisting attorney-client relationship that serves as the foundation
of the Rogers rule.”).
198 See id. at 1156 (holding that an interrogator—who suspects that an attorney may have
entered the custodial matter—has an obligation to inquire regarding the defendant’s
representational status, and the interrogator will be charged with the knowledge that such an
inquiry likely would have revealed).
199 People v. Settles, 385 N.E.2d 612, 613–14 (N.Y. 1978) (“[A] defendant in a
postindictment, prearraignment custodial setting, even though not then represented by an
attorney, may not in the absence of counsel waive his right to have counsel appear at a
corporeal identification.”).
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warrant for the defendant’s arrest for robbery and other charges.200
The defendant was apprehended by police in Georgia and
transferred to New York, where he was subject to indictment.201
New York police officers read the defendant his Miranda rights, but
failed to inform him that he was under indictment for the
robbery.202 After the defendant was given his rights, he agreed to
be in a lineup and was subsequently identified by two individuals as
the perpetrator in the charged offenses.203 Chief Judge Cooke
observed that an official indictment against a defendant shifts “the
character of the police function . . . from investigatory to accusatory”
because the defendant “cannot make any arrangement with the
police which is not subject to the ultimate approval of the court.”204
Consequently, Miranda warnings become insufficient to “satisfy the
higher standard with respect to a waiver of the right to counsel.”205
In People v. Skinner, Chief Judge Cooke remained devoted to
protecting the attorney-client privilege.206 There, the circumstances
at issue involved the police’s pre-arrest investigation and repeated
attempts to question the defendant regarding an unsolved
murder.207 During the midst of these contacts, the defendant
retained an attorney to assist in the matter.208 The attorney
contacted the police to inform them that he was retained, and would
handle all matters relating to the investigation as far as it dealt
with defendant.209 Shortly thereafter, the police confronted the
defendant, without counsel’s knowledge, to serve him with legal
papers seeking to compel his appearance at a corporeal lineup.210
During this contact, the defendant made damaging admissions to
the police regarding the murder.211 Chief Judge Cooke observed
that when an individual “obtain[s] counsel specifically on [a] matter
See id. at 614.
See id.
202 See id.
203 See id.
204 Id. at 616.
205 Id. at 616, 617 (“[N]o knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel may be said to have
occurred without the essential presence of counsel.”). Moreover, the court noted that
“assistance of counsel after indictment at a lineup is an indispensable correlative to a fair
trial. Nice distinctions between the need for counsel at various stages of the proceedings are
irrelevant once the right to counsel has indelibly attached.” Id. at 617–18. Further, “the
[indelible] right to counsel attaches” upon defendant’s request for an attorney, or “after . . .
arraignment . . . [or] upon the filing of an accusatory instrument.” Id. at 615.
206 See People v. Skinner, 417 N.E.2d 501, 502 (N.Y. 1980).
207 See id.
208 See id.
209 See id.
210 See id.
211 See id.
200
201
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under investigation,” the individual cannot be questioned by law
enforcement officers “in a noncustodial setting after [counsel] . . .
instruct[s] the police not to question [the] defendant in [counsel’s]
absence.”212
Although the defendant consented to questioning at police
headquarters, Chief Judge Cooke found that the defendant’s right to
counsel was violated because law enforcement officers knew that
the defendant was represented in the matter under investigation
and questioned him without counsel present.213 He explained:
“Whether a person is in custody at the time of interrogation is not
controlling when an attorney represents that person on the matter
about which he or she is questioned.”214 Chief Judge Cooke
emphasized that police actions infringing upon the central
protections within the attorney-client relationship cannot be
ignored.215
In People v. Cunningham, Chief Judge Cooke also held in no
uncertain terms that “an uncounseled waiver of a constitutional
right will not be deemed voluntary if it is made after the right to
counsel has been invoked.”216 In Cunningham, the defendant was
taken to police headquarters for questioning, where he was read his
Miranda rights.217 At that time, the defendant agreed to speak with
police, but made no incriminating statements.218
Later that
evening, the officers formally informed the defendant that he was
officially under arrest and reiterated the defendant’s Miranda
rights.219 At this juncture, the defendant refused to waive his right
to counsel.220 In response, the police told the defendant that he
would have the opportunity to speak with an attorney after
arraignment; however, the police made no effort to arrange for such

Id. (emphasis added).
See id. at 503.
214 Id. at 504. Chief Judge Cooke also observed: “This court’s vigilance in protecting the
right to counsel finds additional support even in the ethical responsibility of attorneys in civil
matters not to communicate on the subject of the representation with an individual known to
be represented by an attorney on the matter.” Id. at 503–04.
215 See, e.g., People v. Claudio, 629 N.E.2d 384, 387 (N.Y. 1993) (“[People v. Skinner
p]reserv[es] the integrity of an accused’s choice to communicate with police only through
counsel.”); People v. Bell, 535 N.E.2d 1294, 1297 (N.Y. 1989) (“Our ruling [in People v.
Skinner] was designed to prevent the police from rendering the right to counsel ineffective by
questioning the defendant about matters relating to the subject of the representation in the
absence of counsel retained on the matter.”).
216 People v. Cunningham, 400 N.E.2d 360, 361 (N.Y. 1980).
217 See id. at 362 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444–45 (1966)).
218 See Cunningham, 400 N.E.2d at 362.
219 See id.
220 See id.
212
213
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communications.221 Several hours later, the defendant informed
police officers that he wanted to make a statement. Once again,
Miranda warnings were given.222 Although the defendant was
asked to sign the waiver, he reiterated that he would like to speak
with counsel.223 Despite repeatedly changing his mind about
whether he would consent to questioning without an attorney, he
ultimately waived his right and gave incriminating statements to
the police.224
Chief Judge Cooke instructed that “[o]nce an individual expresses
the need for counsel[,] he or she stands in the same position as one
who has obtained the aid of an attorney.”225 He declared that a
defendant has not waived his or her right to counsel, after being
assigned counsel, merely because the defendant does “not want the
lawyer assigned to represent him.”226 Declaring a bright-line rule,
Chief Judge Cooke stated that the right to counsel attaches in two
distinct situations: (1) “upon the commencement of formal
adversary proceedings,” and (2) in “cases in which formal adversary
proceedings have not yet been commenced, but [involves] . . .
suspects in custody who ha[ve] already retained or been assigned
counsel to represent them on the specific charge for which they were
being held.”227 Chief Judge Cooke explained “that a waiver of a
constitutional right will not be deemed ‘voluntary’ unless the police
have ‘scrupulously honored’ the suspect’s prior assertion of his
rights.”228
Although recognizing a need to protect the attorney-client
relationship throughout his time of the bench, Chief Judge Cooke
also observed that such protection could not to become a sprawling
and elastic trap to impede police investigations. For example, in
People v. Mealer,229 Chief Judge Cooke demonstrated a fair and
221
222
223
224
225

364).

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
People v. Skinner, 417 N.E.2d 501, 503 (N.Y. 1980) (citing Cunningham, 400 N.E. 2d at

People v. Grimaldi, 422 N.E.2d 493, 495 n.* (N.Y. 1981).
Cunningham, 400 N.E. 2d at 363, 364.
228 Id. at 362–63 (citing People v. Dean, 393 N.E.2d 1030, 1031 (N.Y. 1979); People v.
Clark, 380 N.E.2d 290, 295 (N.Y. 1978); People v. Munlin, 380 N.E.2d 288, 290 (N.Y. 1978);
People v. Buxton, 44 N.Y.2d 33, 386–87 (N.Y. 1978)); see also Cunningham, 400 N.E.2d at 361
(“[A]n uncounseled waiver of a constitutional right [to counsel] will not be deemed voluntary
if it is made after the right to counsel has been invoked.”).
229 People v. Mealer, 441 N.E.2d 1080 (N.Y. 1982). In Mealer, the defendant was indicted
for murder and subsequently suspected of perjury. See id. at 1082. The defendant bribed a
witness for the state to offer perjured testimony. See id. at 1081. Although the “defendant’s
226
227
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logical balance between the rights of state actors and those of the
accused.230 He explained that “[t]he right to counsel may not be
used as ‘a shield . . .’ to immunize one represented by an attorney
against investigative techniques that capture a new crime in
progress,’” a crime that is independent of the charge for which a
defendant is indicted.231
Similarly, in People v. Ferrara, Cooke directed that under the
federal and New York State Constitutions, “retention of counsel in
connection with a grand jury inquiry [does not] preclude[]
investigative techniques that elicit in a noncustodial setting not a
confession, but a plan to commit a new crime of the type then under
scrutiny.”232
D. New York Practice
Chief Judge Cooke also made significant contributions to the
development of New York Civil Practice and Procedure. He wrote a
number of important opinions concerning the interpretation and
application of state rules governing civil litigation, jurisdiction, res
judicata, and statute of limitation defenses.

right to counsel had attached with respect to the murder charge . . . [and] the witness was
acting as a police agent when he met with [the] defendant with the knowledge and
encouragement of the police . . . [the d]efendant’s right to counsel nevertheless was not
violated.” Id. at 1082 (internal citations omitted).
230 See id. at 1082. In Mirenda, Chief Judge Cooke ruled that a defendant does not have a
state or federal constitutional right “to the assistance of a lawyer while conducting a pro se
defense.” People v. Mirenda, 442 N.E.2d 49, 50 (N.Y. 1982). The defendant moved to appear
pro se, but requested that he be “appointed counsel ‘to act only as an advisor.’” Id. Chief
Judge Cooke rejected the defendant’s request, noting that “[t]he assignment of standby
counsel . . . is a matter of trial management. As such, it is a subject for the discretion of the
trial judge, whose decision will not be disturbed by [the New York Court of Appeals] unless
the judge abuses that discretion.” Id. at 51.
231 Mealer, 441 N.E.2d at 1082 (quoting People v. Ferrara, 430 N.E.2d 1275, 1279 (N.Y.
1981)) (citing People v. Middleton, 430 N.E.2d 1264, 1267 (N.Y. 1981)). The questioning of
the defendant in relation to the new crime “was not used as a pretext for circumventing
defendant’s rights.” Mealer, 441 N.E.2d at 1082.
232 People v. Ferrara, 430 N.E.2d 1275, 1277 (N.Y. 1981).
In Ferrara, the defendant
testified twice before a grand jury. Id. at 1276. At the second grand jury hearing, the
prosecutor informed the defendant and his attorney that the government believed that the
defendant had committed perjury during his uncounseled testimony at the first grand jury
hearing. Id. Despite this accusation, the defendant took the stand and denied paying
kickbacks to a nursing home operator. Id. Subsequent to this counseled interaction, a police
informant set up a meeting with the defendant and recorded the conversation in which the
defendant offered to pay a kickback. Id. at 1276–77. Although unaware that his meeting
with the informant had been recorded, the defendant denied paying kickbacks after being
subpoenaed for a third grand jury hearing. Id. at 1277. The defendant was subsequently
indicted for perjury. Id.
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In George Reiner & Co. v. Schwartz,233 Chief Judge Cooke
recognized that New York courts enjoy a liberal reign of jurisdiction
over nonresidents pursuant to CPLR 302(a)(1).234 In determining
whether jurisdiction is proper under CPLR 302(a)(1), he noted that
while a nonresident’s activities must be viewed collectively, there
are also instances where a single act by a nondomiciliary defendant
may be sufficient under the “transacting business” standard,
without any further requirements, to establish personal
jurisdiction.235
In Schwarz, the defendant, a Massachusetts
resident, entered into New York to execute an agreement with a
New York corporation for work to be performed outside the state as
an out-of-state salesman.236 Years later, the corporation filed suit
against the defendant for violating the terms of the agreement.237
The defendant moved to dismiss the action based upon the court’s
lack of subject matter and personal jurisdiction.238 The defendant
claimed that he had not transacted business within the State of
New York, as he had only entered the state on a single occasion to
execute an out-of-state employment agreement.239
Chief Judge Cooke rejected the defendant’s jurisdictional defense,
noting that he had purposefully entered into New York to execute
an agreement with one of its residents and, by doing so, established
a continuing relationship with a New York employer.240
He
observed that the court’s exercise of jurisdiction was constitutional
because the “defendant ha[d] purposefully availed himself of the
privilege of conducting activities in our jurisdiction, thus invoking
the benefits and protection of our laws.”241 He concluded that the
nature and quality of the defendant’s actions were significant, and
the execution of the contract was an obligatory commitment that
created a continuing relationship with a resident of the state that
developed for years after.242 Chief Judge Cooke explained that the
George Reiner & Co. v. Schwartz, 363 N.E.2d 551 (N.Y. 1977).
See id. at 553.
235 Id.
236 Id. at 551–52.
237 Id. at 552. The corporation alleged that the defendant had “knowingly, willfully[,] and
fraudulently violated the terms of the contract,” and it sought recovery for purported
overdrawing of commissions. Id.
238 Id.
The Special Term granted the defendant’s motion, holding that plaintiff lacked
personal jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(1). Id. at 551, 553. However, a divided appellate
division reversed and reinstated the complaint. Id. at 551.
239 Id. at 554–55 (quoting Hi Fashion Wigs, Inc. v. Peter Hammond Adv., Inc., 300 N.E.2d
421, 423 (N.Y. 1973)).
240 Schwartz, 363 N.E.2d at 555.
241 Id. at 554.
242 See id. at 554–55.
233
234
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nature and quality of the contact is determinative, and not the
quantity or professed isolation of a nonresident’s interaction with its
residents.243
Chief Judge Cooke concluded that the signing of the contract,
although an isolated incident in time, triggered an ongoing
relationship between the defendant and a corporation of the state
that allowed the court to properly exercise its jurisdiction over the
defendant under CPLR 302(a)(1).244
He explained that the
defendant’s activities “cannot be reasonably viewed as merely the
‘last act marking the formal execution of the contract.’”245 When
analyzing the nature of the defendant’s contact, Chief Judge Cooke
noted that this was more than a mere and casual attempt directed
towards New York, as the purposeful activity of interviewing,
negotiating and contracting “[required] no longer or more extensive
negotiations or more detailed agreement . . . necessary to establish
an employer-employee relationship.”246
In O’Brien v. City of Syracuse,247 Chief Judge Cooke determined
that the doctrine of res judicata bars “[a] property owner who
unsuccessfully asserts against a governmental entity a claim for de
facto appropriation . . . [from] later bring[ing] another action for
trespass in an attempt to recover damages for the same acts as
those on which the first lawsuit was grounded.”248 The plaintiffs
owned property in an area that state officials had sought to
restore.249
In 1973, the plaintiffs commenced an article 78
proceeding contending that state actors had seriously interfered
with their property rights during the rehabilitation process, which
they contended amounted to a de facto appropriation by the city.250
In a nonjury trial, the claim “was dismissed for failure to establish a
de facto taking.”251 Following judgment, the plaintiffs filed another
complaint, generally reasserting the allegations of the prior
petition, and adding a claim of averment by which the city had
taken the property by tax deed on June 1, 1977.252
The
“[d]efendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of res

243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252

Id. at 555.
See id. at 554, 555.
Id. at 554.
Id.
O’Brien v. City of Syracuse, 429 N.E.2d 1158 (N.Y. 1981).
Id. at 1159.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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judicata, which . . . was granted with leave to amend.”253
Thereafter, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint with the same
claims, “and adding . . . statements that [the] defendants [had]
‘wrongfully, unlawfully and willfully’ trespassed” and damaged
their “property at various times during the period 1967 to 1978.”254
The defendants “moved to dismiss on the grounds of res judicata,
statute of limitations, and failure to serve timely a notice of
claim.”255 The state supreme court denied the motion on all
grounds, and “concluded that no bar existed because there were
involved materially different elements of proof for the two theories
of recovery.”256
“The Appellate Division, Fourth Department,
reversed on the reasoning that the entire action was barred by the
doctrine of res judicata[.]”257 It dismissed the complaint in its
entirety.258
Chief Judge Cooke observed that the plaintiff’s current cause of
action consisted of: “(1) those concerning activities underlying the
1973 litigation; and (2) those asserting trespass generally.”259 He
noted that “[o]nly the claims encompassed by the first category
[we]re definitely barred by res judicata.”260
Conducting a
transactional analysis, the Chief Judge determined that all of the
claims presented during a prior suit, as the basis for that litigation,
were barred since “[t]hat proceeding . . . [was] brought to a final
conclusion, [and therefore,] no other claim [could] be predicated
upon the same incidents.”261 He explained that:
When alternative theories are available to recover what is
essentially the same relief for harm arising out of the same
or related facts such as would constitute a single “factual
grouping,” the circumstance that the theories involve
materially different elements of proof will not justify
presenting the claim by two different actions.262
Chief Judge Cooke agreed with the appellate division, observing
Id.
Id.
255 Id.
256 Id.
257 Id.
258 Id.
259 Id.
260 Id. Chief Judge Cooke dismissed the complaint due to the plaintiff’s failure to serve
timely a notice of claim, although finding that “the second category of allegations—the
general trespass allegations—are not barred by res judicata to the extent that they describe
acts occurring after the 1973 lawsuit.” Id. at 1160.
261 Id. at 1159.
262 Id. at 1160.
253
254
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that “once a claim is brought to a final conclusion, all other claims
arising out of the same transaction . . . are barred, even if based
upon different theories or if seeking a different remedy.”263 He
observed: “In effect, de facto appropriation may be characterized as
an aggravated form of trespass. The pertinent evidence in both
actions is the same. The basic distinction lies in the egregiousness
of the trespass and whether it is of such intensity as to amount to a
taking.”264
In McDermott v. Torre,265 Chief Judge Cooke addressed a
significant statute of limitation question concerning a medical
malpractice action against a physician and laboratory that had
misdiagnosed the plaintiff’s mole as noncancerous.266 The treating
physician had contacted the laboratory to review a specimen of the
plaintiff’s mole.267 After reviewing the specimen, the laboratory
informed the physician, who relayed the message to the plaintiff,
that the results were negative and nothing further was required.268
Over the next several years, the physician continued to treat the
plaintiff for unrelated and general physical ailments.269
On
occasion, however, the plaintiff complained about a pain in her
ankle, which the physician “reassured her that there was no cause
for concern.”270 Thereafter, the plaintiff discovered a lump in her
groin, a malignant melanoma from the site where the mole had
been removed four years earlier.271
Chief Judge Cooke dismissed the plaintiff’s cause of action
against the laboratory,272 finding that it was barred by the statute
of limitations.273 He explained that the three-year statute of
limitations applied for actions based on acts of continuous medical
treatment, rather than the shorter period of CPLR 214-a.274 He
noted that the plaintiff’s action against the laboratory was timebarred because there was no evidence of continuing treatment by
the laboratory and more than thirty-two months had elapsed

Id. at 1159 (citing Reilly, 379 N.E.2d at 176).
Id. at 1160.
265 McDermott v. Torre, 437 N.E.2d 1108 (N.Y. 1982).
266 See id. at 1109–10.
267 Id. at 1110.
268 Id.
269 Id.
270 Id.
271 Id.
272 Id. at 1112.
273 Id. at 1109, 1112.
274 Id. at 1109, 1111 (noting that effective July 1, 1975, while plaintiff’s treatment was
continuing, the period was reduced to 2.5 years under CPLR 214-a).
263
264
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between plaintiff’s last visit and service of summons.275 As for the
physician, Chief Judge Cooke noted that summary judgment was
not appropriate, as there were issues of fact regarding whether
there had been continuous treatment, thereby triggering the threeyear statute of limitations from the last date of treatment.276
Notably, Chief Judge Cooke provided an in-depth discussion as to
why the claim could not survive against the laboratory under the
doctrine of “continuing treatment by the physician.”277
He
explained that “[c]ontinuous treatment serves simply as a toll—the
action may be brought at any time, but the patient will not be
compelled to initiate judicial proceedings so long as the physician
continues to treat the injury.”278 Cooke observed that “[i]mplicit in
the policy is the recognition that the doctor not only is in a position
to identify and correct his or her malpractice, but is best placed to
do so.”279 As for the laboratory, however, he noted that these policy
considerations did not apply, because the laboratory “does not have
the opportunity to discover an error in a report. Instead, it must
rely on the treating physician to discover any diagnostic mistake.”280
In this context, Cooke observed: “[T]he inquiry necessarily must be
directed to the nature of a laboratory’s relationship to the
patient.”281 He concluded that, in the absence of evidence showing
an agency or other relevant relationship between the laboratory and
doctor or some relevant continuing relation between the laboratory
and the patient, the laboratories were nothing more than an
independent contractor with no continuing relation to plaintiff to
allow the continuing treatment to be imputed from the general care
provider.282
In Mills v. Monroe County,283 Chief Judge Cooke affirmed the
appellate division’s decision to dismiss an employment
discrimination claim as untimely.284 The plaintiff had failed to
timely file a notice of claim against the county.285 Chief Judge
Cooke observed that a time-barred claim may only continue if the
action was brought to vindicate a public interest, or with leave of
275
276
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285

See id. at 1111.
See id.
See id. at 1109, 1112.
Id. at 1111–12 (citing Borgia v. New York, 187 N.E.2d 777, 778 (N.Y. 1962)).
Id. at 1112.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Mills v. Cty. of Monroe, 451 N.E.2d 456 (1983).
See id. at 457.
Id. at 456–57.
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the court.286 He explained:
When an employment discrimination action is brought
against a county under the state or federal civil rights
statutes, the failure to timely file a notice of claim shall be
fatal unless the action has been brought to vindicate a public
interest or leave to serve late notice has been granted by the
court.287
Chief Judge Cooke rejected the plaintiff’s contention that her
cause of action was brought to vindicate a public interest, noting
that her allegations were narrowly tailored to personal interest, and
“her action seeks relief only for her termination, which she alleges
resulted from her opposition to the county’s discriminatory practices
and her race and national origin.”288 He further rejected the
plaintiff’s argument that the notice of claim requirement contained
in the state’s law—section 52 of the County Law—should not apply
to either her federal or state civil rights claims.289 Cooke explained
that “[i]f success of the § 1983 action were the only benchmark,
there would be no reason at all to look to state law, for the
appropriate rule would then always be the one favoring the
plaintiff, and its source would be essentially irrelevant.”290 He
concluded: “[T]he state’s notice requirements are [not] antithetical
to the policy underlying the civil rights laws.”291
In McDermott v. City of New York,292 Chief Judge Cooke reversed
a trial court’s decision dismissing as untimely a third-party
complaint by the city seeking indemnification from the
manufacturer of a truck it had purchased.293 After being sued by
one of its employees whose arm was severed by the sanitation
truck’s hopper mechanism, the city brought a third-party action
against the manufacturer alleging that the mechanism was
defective.294
The manufacturer sought to dismiss the
indemnification action as untimely, noting that the third-party
complaint was commenced in 1975, although the truck was
delivered to the city on February 5, 1969.295 Chief Judge Cooke
Id. at 456.
Id.
288 Id. at 458–59 (noting that the plaintiff sought money damages for her loss of wages and
damage to her reputation).
289 Id. at 457.
290 Id. (quoting Bd. of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 488 (1980)).
291 Mills, 451 N.E.2d at 457.
292 McDermott v. City of New York, 406 N.E.2d 460 (N.Y. 1980).
293 Id. at 461.
294 Id.
295 Id.
286
287
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rejected this argument, explaining that the city’s cause for
indemnification began accruing upon payment to its worker for his
injuries, rather than from date of delivery of the sanitation truck,
even though the third-party complaint by the city was based on
products liability.296 He observed: “[G]iven the quasi contractual
character of the indemnification action, it was obvious that the
contract statute of limitations, now six years, would be held
controlling.”297
In Fleishman v. Eli Lilly & Co.,298 Chief Judge Cooke provided
significant input, although in dissent, relating to the issue of when
a medical claim “accrues” under the applicable statute of
limitations.299
In Fleishman, the plaintiffs sought to recover
damages as a result of medical injuries caused by their exposure to
the drug Diethylstilbestrol (“DES”).300 The injuries suffered by the
plaintiffs arose after the applicable statute of limitations had
expired.301 The trial court granted the defendants motion to
dismiss, holding that each complaint was time-barred.302 The New
York Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding
that medical malpractice actions began to accrue when the plaintiffs
were first exposed to DES and not when the injurious effect of the
exposure manifested.303 The court observed that “[a]ny departure
from the policies underlying these well-established precedents is a
matter for the legislature and not the courts.”304 The court noted
“that a cause of action for personal injuries caused by a toxic
substance accrue[s] and the limitations period beg[ins] to run upon
exposure to the substance.”305
Disagreeing with the court’s rationale, Chief Judge Cooke
observed: “[T]he law is not and should not be so inflexible that it
296 See id. (“The cause of action for indemnification interposed against the manufacturer of
an allegedly defective product is independent of the underlying wrong and for the purpose of
the statute of limitations accrues when the loss is suffered by the party seeking indemnity.
Hence, the dismissal of that part of the third-party complaint seeking indemnity, as barred by
the four-year statute of limitations for breach of warranty measured from the date of tender
of delivery . . . was unwarranted.”).
297 Id. at 462.
298 Fleishman v. Lilly & Co., 467 N.E.2d 517 (N.Y. 1984), cert denied 469 U.S. 1192 (1985),
superseded by statute, N.Y. C.P.L.R. 214-c (McKinney 2017).
299 Fleishman, 467 N.E.2d at 519 (Cooke, C.J., dissenting).
300 Manno v. Levi, 465 N.Y.S.2d 219, 220 (App. Div. 1983), aff’d, 467 N.E.2d 517 (N.Y.
1984), cert denied 469 U.S. 1192 (1985), superseded by statute, N.Y. C.P.L.R. 214-c.
301 Id.
302 Id. at 221, 222.
303 See Fleishman, 467 N.E.2d at 518.
304 Id. at 518.
305 Enright v. Eli Lilly & Co., 570 N.E.2d 198, 200–01 (N.Y. 1991) (citing Fleishman, 467
N.E.2d at 518).
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cannot correct itself from injustice and unfounded concerns
espoused in prior decisions.”306 He explained that the doctrine
controlling the dates in which a claim accrues “should not be used
as a shield behind which a court may hide as reason for
perpetuating unnecessary and profound unfairness, which subjects
the law to ridicule.”307 Chief Judge Cooke rejected the proposition
that the application of a statute of limitations is exclusively within
the control and interpretation of the legislative body of
government.308 He noted:
That the determination of when a cause of action accrues is
not solely a matter for the legislature, [and as] is plainly
evident by this court’s determination here and previously,
that a cause of action of this type accrues upon injury which
is assumed to occur at the time of exposure, ingestion or
injection of the cancer-causing foreign substance.309
Chief Judge Cooke explained that the court had misinterpreted
the policy behind the imposition of statute of limitations.310 He
noted that the limitations run based upon the balancing of interests
between the parties, ensuring that both parties’ interests are
protected under the law.311 He concluded that “the balance of policy
considerations weighs heavily in favor of plaintiffs and indicates
that a discovery rule or, at the very least, a true date of medicalinjury rule should be adopted for the accrual of the causes of
action.”312 As a result, he advocated that “[t]hese cases present a
compelling argument for adopting a discovery rule.”313
Notably, a few years later, the New York Court of Appeals
overturned the Fleishman decision,314 as the state legislature
306 Fleishman, 467 N.E.2d at 518 (citing Woods v. Lancet, 102 N.E.2d 691, 694 (N.Y.
1951)).
307 Fleishman, 467 N.E.2d at 518.
308 See id. at 519.
309 Id.
310 See id. at 519–20 (“A statute of limitations serves in part to prevent plaintiffs from
sleeping on their rights or waiting to assert stale claims and to ensure that defendants will
receive notice of claims as soon as practicable. In these cases, the plaintiffs cannot be said to
have purposefully or unreasonably waited to bring suit because no injuries were known by
them to occur at the time of their ingestion of or exposure to DES.” (first citing Urie v.
Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 170 (1949); then citing Raymond v. Eli Lilly & Co. 371 A.2d 170, 174
(N.H. 1977))).
311 See Fleishman, 467 N.E.2d at 519 (quoting Victorson v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 335
N.E.2d 275, 279 (N.Y. 1975)).
312 Fleishman, 467 N.E.2d at 519.
313 Id. at 520.
314 See Enright v. Eli Lilly & Co., 570 N.E.2d 198, 200 (N.Y. 1991) (first citing Fleishman,
467 N.Y.2d 198; then citing N.Y. C.P.L.R. 214-c (McKinney 2017)). The court recognized that
special rules have been fashioned by the legislature and “are a response to unique procedural
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implicitly adopted Chief Judge Cooke’s proposition for an equitable
discovery rule in unique medical cases, such as those presented by
individuals exposed to DES.315 The state’s legislature enacted “a
‘discovery’ statute of limitations [that] was directed at opening up
traditional avenues of recovery by removing a procedural barrier
that was unreasonable given the nature of DES injuries.”316 In
1986, the New York State legislature recognized that “claims for
injuries caused by exposure to DES and other toxic substances were
often time-barred before the harmful effects of the exposure could be
discovered, [and] changed the law to provide that the limitations
period in exposure cases begins to run upon discovery of the
injury.”317 The legislature also “revived for one year previously
time-barred causes of action based on exposure to DES and four
other toxic substances.”318
E. Privileges
Chief Judge Cooke’s wrote several instructive opinions regarding
a party’s right not to disclose information that is privileged. In
Matter of Beach v. Shanley,319 Chief Judge Cooke established that
New York’s Shield Law (Civil Rights Law § 79-h) offered a broad
and unqualified privilege to journalists who refused to disclose
information or sources to state officials.320 Specifically, Chief Judge
Cooke observed that the law created a journalistic privilege against
compulsory disclosure of news sources to a grand jury, even if the
source’s disclosure of information may itself have constituted
criminal activity.321 In Beach, a grand jury investigation was
conducted on the Rensselaer County sheriff’s office: a captain and
lieutenant were alleged to be involved in illegal weapon sales.322
The grand jury failed to indict either suspect, but issued damaging
reports recommending their removal from official duty.323 An
unidentified source contacted the defendant, a local television
reporter, and offered information about the sealed reports
contingent upon the defendant’s promise not to release the source’s
barriers and problems of proof peculiar to DES litigation.” Enright, 570 N.Y.2d at 201–02.
315 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 214-c.
316 Enright, 570 N.E.2d at 202.
317 Id. at 201 (citing N.Y. C.P.L.R. 214-c).
318 Enright, 570 N.E.2d at 201 (citation omitted).
319 Beach v. Shanley, 465 N.E.2d 304 (N.Y. 1984).
320 See id. at 310.
321 See id. at 309, 310.
322 See id. at 306.
323 See id.
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identity.324 The defendant agreed, and later reported that the grand
jury had recommended the removal of the sheriff.325 Thereafter,
another grand jury convened to investigate the “disclosure of a
certain sealed grand jury report.”326 The defendant was served with
a subpoena to appear before the grand jury in an effort to determine
“whether the contents of the sealed report were disclosed by a grand
juror or a public official or public employee in violation of section
215.70 of the Penal Law.”327 The defendant moved to quash the
subpoena, which was eventually granted by the trial court.328
Chief Judge Cooke rejected the district attorney’s contention that
Article I of the New York State Constitution invalidated the
evidentiary privileges set forth by the Shield Law when relating to
grand jury subpoenas.329
He explained: “The constitutional
provision against impairing a grand jury’s power was not intended
to prevent the legislature from creating evidentiary privileges or
their equivalent that have an incidental impact on investigations
into willful misconduct by public officers.”330 Instead, Chief Judge
Cooke thought that “the proposal was advanced solely for the
purpose of making certain that the legislature of this state would
never be able to . . . take from the grand jury its authority to
investigate and indict for alleged criminal acts by public officials.”331
He concluded that the relevant provisions of Article I targeted only
“legislation that directly restricts a grand jury’s right to inquire or
that, although facially neutral, would have its primary impact by
limiting investigations of public officers.”332
He stated
unequivocally that the Shield Law was not such a statute, since
“[i]ts impact on investigations . . . [was] incidental.”333
Chief Judge Cooke recognized that “a grand jury’s power to issue
subpoenas is unfettered,”334 but the Shield Law was constructed to
protect reporters from contempt, fine, or imprisonment for their
See id.
See id.
326 Id.
327 Id.
328 See id. at 307 (noting that after the trial court quashed the subpoena, the appellate
division reversed). That court reasoned that the Shield Law was invalid because it “impaired
a grand jury’s power to investigate public officials.” Id.
329 See id. at 311. Article I, section 6, of the state Constitution proscribes the legislature
from enacting any laws that impair or suspend a grand jury’s power to investigate willful
misconduct. N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 6.
330 Beach, 465 N.E.2d at 310.
331 Id. (quoting In re Wood v. Hughes, 173 N.E.2d 21, 24 (N.Y. 1961)).
332 Beach, 465 N.E.2d at 311.
333 Id.
334 Id. at 307.
324
325
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refusal to disclose information “regardless of whether the
information is highly relevant to a governmental inquiry and
whether the information was solicited or volunteered.”335 Chief
Judge Cooke emphasized the plain language of the statute, which
read that “[a]ny information obtained in violation of the . . .
[statute] shall be inadmissible in any action or proceeding or
hearing before any agency.”336 He noted that “the Shield Law
provides a broad protection to journalists without any qualifying
language.”337 Thus, the protection extended regardless of whether
the reporter observed criminal activity or “even when the act of
divulging the information was itself criminal conduct.”338
In Matter of Bronx Cty. Grand Jury Investigation,339 Chief Judge
Cooke rendered an important decision concerning both spousal and
attorney-client privileges.340 The case stemmed from evidence
gathered by the district attorney’s office in its investigation of the
murder of Clara Vanderbilt.341 The defendant presumed that he
was a target of the investigation.342 While at work, the defendant
made a tape-recorded message addressed to his wife.343 That
evening, the defendant unsuccessfully attempted suicide.344 The
Id. at 309.
Beach, 465 N.E.2d at 309 (quoting N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h(d) (McKinney 2017)).
337 Beach, 465 N.E.2d at 310. Three years after Beach, in Knight-Ridder Broadcasting,
Inc., the Court of Appeals readdressed the issue of the existence or nonexistence of a
confidentiality requirement in the amended Shield Law. See Knight-Ridder Broadcasting,
Inc. v. Greenberg, 505 N.Y.S.2d 368, 370 (App. Div. 1986), aff’d, 511 N.E.2d 1116 (N.Y. 1987).
The appellate division in Knight-Ridder declined to interpret Chief Judge Cooke’s language in
Beach that the Shield Law afforded a “broad protection to journalists without any qualifying
language” to nullify the requirement of a confidentiality agreement that the Shield Law
originally required for privilege protections. Id. at 371 (quoting Beach, 465 N.E.2d at 310).
Years later, in Sullivan, the state supreme court in Queens County suggested that Beach
overruled judicial interpretations of the Shield Law that maintained a confidentiality
requirement throughout its various amendments, while Knight-Ridder reinstated the “cloak
of confidentiality” to journalistic privilege. See Sullivan v. Hurley, 635 N.Y.S.2d 437, 439
(Sup. Ct. 1995) (quoting Knight-Ridder Broadcasting, Inc., 511 N.E.2d at 1118).
338 Beach, 465 N.E.2d at 310. Judge Wachtler wrote a concurring opinion in Beach, stating
that he would have deemed the quashing proper not just because of the Shield Law privilege
but because such protection should be a matter of right under the state constitutional
freedom of the press. Id. at 311 (Wachtler, J., concurring). Chief Judge Cooke declined to
conduct a constitutional analysis, noting that “[c]ourts should not decide constitutional
questions when a case can be disposed of on a nonconstitutional ground.” Id. (majority
opinion). Judge Meyer issued a dissent in Beach. Id. at 312 (Meyer, J., dissenting). He
argued that the majority misinterpreted the scope of Article I, section 6, by erroneously
searching for intent beyond the “clarity of the constitutional provision.” See id. at 312–13.
339 In re Bronx Cty. Grand Jury Investigation, 439 N.E.2d 378 (N.Y. 1982).
340 See id. at 380.
341 See id.
342 See id.
343 See id.
344 See id.
335
336
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defendant’s wife later discovered the tape.345 She did not listen to
the tape, but instead gave it to her friend, who was an attorney.346
Thereafter, the defendant’s office was searched for additional
documents and recordings.347 A second tape was found in his
desk.348 Both tapes were eventually received and held by the
defendant’s attorney.349 Although the defendant was ordered to
turn over the tapes, he failed to comply.350 The defendant argued
that the first tape contained information protected by the marital
privilege and the second tape was protected by both the attorneyclient privilege and his right against self-incrimination.351
The trial court quashed the subpoenas, but was reversed on
appeal.352
The appellate division rejected both arguments of
353
privilege.
The court observed that the privilege applies only to
confidential statements “induced by the marital relation and
prompted by the affection, confidence and loyalty engendered by
such relationship.”354 The court also ordered a scientific inspection
of the first tape to determine whether its content had been
altered.355 As to the first tape, Chief Judge Cooke rejected the
appellate division’s holding. He found that a communication is
made during marriage even if the intention is that the message will
be received after death, because such a communication cannot be
considered to be made in contemplation of destroying the
marriage.356 He observed that the exception for statements aimed
at destroying a marriage concerns the “nature of the statement
itself.”357 Chief Judge Cooke explained that a declaration made
during a suicide attempt might possibly be the “last attempt to
preserve the affection that gave rise to the marriage.”358 In the
absence of any other evidence on the record suggesting otherwise,
he determined that the messages were indeed induced by the
marriage.359
345
346
347
348
349
350
351
352
353
354
355
356
357
358
359

See id.
See id. at 380–81.
See id. at 381.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 382.
Id. at 381.
See id. at 382.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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To satisfy the element of confidentiality, Chief Judge Cooke noted
that the defendant delivered it to his wife, outside the presence of
the third parties, who then effectively delivered it to the lawyer.360
He explained that when the lawyer first found the tape, only the
two spouses knew of its existence and message.361 Thus, the
delivery of the tape to third parties for safekeeping did not destroy
the privilege, because the third parties had “no justifiable interest
in becoming privy to the marital privilege.”362 Chief Judge Cooke
further explained that the privilege only fails “when the substance
of a communication, and not the mere fact of its occurrence, is
revealed to third parties.”363 Moreover, Chief Judge Cooke did not
find a basis for ordering a scientific examination of the tape, since
“[o]nce it is determined that the contents of the tape were
privileged, it is irrelevant whether there have been erasures or
other deletions.”364
In regard to the second tape, Chief Judge Cooke declined to accept
the defense’s argument that the attorney’s disclosure of the tape
would violate the defendant’s Fifth Amendment protection against
self-incrimination.365 He observed that an attorney may not directly
assert a protection claim based on a Fifth Amendment right held by
his client.366 The coercive power of the subpoena is directed at the
attorney, but production would in no way self-incriminate him to
implicate the commands of the Fifth Amendment.367 Nevertheless,
Chief Judge Cooke did accept the defendant’s argument that “[a]n
attorney may rely on the attorney-client privilege to prevent
discovery of materials that would not have been discoverable if in
the client’s hands.”368 Chief Judge Cooke undertook a two-pronged
analysis to determine if an attorney can assert attorney-client
privilege to prevent discovery of materials that would not have been
discoverable in the client’s possession.369 The first factor was
whether the attorney received the material under circumstances
giving rise to the privilege.370 If so, then the court must consider
whether the material would have been protected in the client’s
360
361
362
363
364
365
366
367
368
369
370

See id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 382–83.
Id. at 383.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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possession.371
Chief Judge Cooke explained:
While it is true that the attorney-client privilege does not
attach unless there is a “confidential communication”
between counsel and his or her client, this does not require
that all aspects of the communication, including its topic,
must be confidential for the privilege to attach. Rather, the
pertinent “confidence” arises from the attorney-client
relationship and the privacy of the conversation or
communication to the attorney.372
Chief Judge Cooke explained that only actual disclosure, and not
mere intent, will breach the privilege.373 Therefore, if no actual
disclosure has occurred, the privilege remains intact even if the
client had intended to disclose the substance of the material.374
Ultimately, the Chief held that the attorney-client privilege
attached because the tape’s recording was uttered only to the
lawyer “by his client who was seeking legal advice and outside the
presence of any third party with no intention that it be passed to
another.”375
Furthermore, Chief Judge Cooke observed that had the tape
remained in the defendant’s possession, it would have been
protected.376 He explained that testimonial evidence is “that which
communicates the witness’s ideas or thoughts, that exposes the
witness’s mental state or thought process.”377 Both the evidence
and the act of production must include “some testimonial
quality.”378
Chief Judge Cooke reasoned that the lawyer’s
production of the tape was “testimonial by virtue of his
authentication, express or implied, of the tape,” including “the
circumstances of its preparation, its accuracy, and the conclusions
drawn from it.”379
Id.
Id. at 384.
373 Id.
374 Id.
375 Id.
376 Id. at 384–85, 386. Judge Jasen authored a partial concurring and dissenting opinion
in this case. Id. at 386 (Jasen, J., dissenting). He disagreed that the second tape was
protected by the attorney-client privilege. Id. at 387. Even though the defendant’s wife
delivered the tape to the lawyer for the purpose of obtaining legal advice, the lawyer conceded
that he never listened to it. Id. at 388. Therefore, Judge Jasen reasoned, there was only a
disclosure of the existence of the tape, which could hardly be confidential considering the
multiple persons who had knowledge of the tape’s existence. Id. at 387.
377 Id. at 385 (majority opinion).
378 Id.
379 Id.
371
372
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F. Family Law
Chief Judge Cooke wrote many instructive opinions dealing with
family law. His sense of fairness and his desire for justice in
judicial proceedings was most evident in his resolve of matters
concerning paternity, child custody, and parental rights.
For example, in Matter of Vicki B. & David H.,380 Chief Judge
Cooke decided that a paternity proceeding to determine paternity of
a child born out of wedlock was not barred by the statute of
limitations when the putative father had acknowledged being the
father by providing financial support during the child’s infancy.381
He observed that “[w]hen a putative father has acknowledged
paternity either in writing or through the furnishing of support
payments, the time within which a paternity proceeding must be
brought is not restricted by any statutory limitation.”382 He
reversed the appellate division and reinstated the family court
order finding no time bar.383
In Dickson v. Lascaris,384 Chief Judge Cooke reversed the denial
of a father’s petition to regain custody of his children from a third
party.385 Specifically, the father petitioned the court to reclaim
custody of his three children, who he had entrusted to a friend.386
After his wife’s refusal to help with the upbringing of the children,
he tried to raise the children himself.387 However, after realizing he
could not manage such task alone, he entrusted the care of his
children to a friend of his father.388 Several years later, after
remarrying and establishing regular contact with his children, he
sought to regain custody.389 Granting his request, Chief Judge
Cooke explained: “[B]etween a parent and a third person, parental
custody of a child may not be displaced absent grievous cause or
necessity.”390 He stated: “[A] child is not a piece of property over
whom title may be acquired by adverse possession,”391 and that
when deciding who should have custody of the child, the best
380
381
382
383
384
385
386
387
388
389
390
391

In re Vicki B. v. David H., 442 N.E.2d 1248 (N.Y. 1982).
Id. at 1248.
Id.
See id. at 1249.
In re Dickson v. Lascaris, 423 N.E.2d 361 (N.Y. 1981).
See id. at 362.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 363.
Id.
Id. at 364.
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interests of that child must always come first.392
Similarly, in Matter of Leon R.R.,393 Chief Judge Cooke reversed
the family court’s granting of a petition to terminate parental rights
of a child’s natural parents.394 The child was removed from the
custody of his parents when he was a year and a half old because of
accusations of neglect.395 He remained with his foster parents for
over eight years, after which time, measures were taken to
reintegrate him back with his natural parents.396 However, efforts
by the foster agency seemingly left the natural parent’s requests
unanswered.397
The agency alleged that the child was a
permanently neglected child, and therefore wanted to terminate the
parental rights and award permanent custody to the foster
parents.398
Chief Judge Cooke rejected the agency’s request, noting that they
failed to show that the natural parents permanently neglected the
child as required by law. He noted that the agency was required to
prove that the parents:
[F]ailed for a period of more than one year following the date
such child came into the care of an authorized agency
substantially and continuously or repeatedly to maintain
contact with or plan for the future of the child, although
physically and financially able to do so, notwithstanding the
agency’s diligent efforts to encourage and strengthen the
parental relationship when such efforts will not be
detrimental to the best interests of the child.399
Chief Judge Cooke also found that the record demonstrated that
the respondents availed themselves of every opportunity to
strengthen the parent-child relationship between them and the
child, but that the petitioner had sought to impede these
attempts.400
In People ex rel. Sibley v. Sheppard,401 Chief Judge Cooke issued
an opinion protecting the right of grandparents to remain in contact
with a grandchild who was taken from the natural mother after

392
393
394
395
396
397
398
399
400
401

See id. at 363–64 (citing Bennett v. Jeffreys, 356 N.E.2d 277, 283 (N.Y. 1976)).
In re Leon R.R., 397 N.E.2d 374 (N.Y. 1979).
See id. at 376.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 377.
See id. at 379.
Id.
See id.
People ex rel. Sibley v. Sheppard, 429 N.E.2d 1049 (N.Y. 1981).
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neglect proceedings.402 The petitioner, the child’s grandmother,
visited the child regularly until his temporary custodians
(respondents) adopted him.403 After adoption, the respondents
made it difficult for her to visit, which led to a petition under section
72 of the New York Domestic Relations Law to preserve the
vitiation rights of the child’s natural grandparent.404 Chief Judge
Cooke declared that an adopted child may not be completely
isolated from her natural born family, especially when statutory law
grants the natural grandparents a visitation right if in the child’s
best interest.405 He rejected the respondent’s contention that
section 117 of the Domestic Relations Law allowed the rights of the
natural family of an adopted child to be severed at the time of
adoption.406 Similarly, Chief Judge Cooke rejected the respondent’s
constitutional challenges (invasion of familial privacy), noting that
parents are not free to act in whatever way they wish.407 He
explained that a family is within the scope of regulation if it is for
the benefit of public policy, and permitting a natural grandparent to
visit with their grandchild does not impede on any constitutional
rights to privacy.408
In In re Sheila G.,409 Chief Judge Cooke issued an opinion
establishing the duty of child-care agencies to facilitate and assist
parents in maintaining contact with children held in the agency’s
temporary care. There, a child was born out of wedlock and
voluntarily placed up for adoption by her mother with the New York
City Department of Social Services.410 The child was then placed in
foster care with Brookwood Child Care Agency.411 A month and a
half later, her natural born father contacted Brookwood requesting
a meeting with agency officials, in which he stated that he wanted
to be able to visit with and financially support the child.412 The
agents at Brookwood informed the father that the mother had
adamantly refused permission for him to contact his daughter, and
See id. at 1050.
See id.
404 Id. New York law recognizes the rights of a natural grandparent and states that “when
one or both parents are deceased, a proceeding in habeas corpus may be brought against a
person who has ‘the care, custody, and control of’ the grandchild.” Id. (quoting N.Y. DOM.
REL. LAW § 72(1) (McKinney 2017)).
405 See Sheppard, 429 N.E.2d at 1051–52.
406 See id. at 1050–51.
407 Id. at 1052.
408 See id.
409 In re Sheila G., 462 N.E.2d 1139 (N.Y. 1984).
410 Id. at 1141.
411 Id.
412 Id.
402
403
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he was told that until he could formally establish paternity, the
agents would be bound by the mother’s wishes.413 Months later, the
mother decided to allow visitation rights to the father,414 who
planned to adopt the child in the near future after being able to
determine paternity.415 Later, the agency rejected his request,
noting that it took eighteen months total.416 The agency noted that
the lapse of time was indicative of his inability to plan for the child’s
future.417
The family court denied the agency’s petition for
permanent neglect and noted that it had undermined the potential
relationship between the father and child.418 However, the court
was reversed by the appellate division, which found that the
father’s procrastination gave rise to a determination of permanent
neglect.419
Rejecting the appellate division’s finding, Chief Judge Cooke
explained:
When a child-care agency has custody of a child and brings a
proceeding to terminate parental rights on the ground of
permanent neglect, it must affirmatively plead in detail and
prove by clear and convincing evidence that it has fulfilled
its statutory duty to exercise diligent efforts to strengthen
the parent-child relationship and to reunite the family. Only
when this duty has been deemed satisfied may a court
consider and determine whether the parent has fulfilled his
or her duties to maintain contact with and plan for the
future of the child.420
Chief Judge Cooke explained that only when an agency has tried
to assist a parent in meaningful ways, such as: providing counseling
with respect to a problem that interferes with the return of the
Id.
Id.
415 Id.
416 See id. at 1142.
417 See id. The definition for “permanent neglect” is codified in section 384-b(7) of the New
York Social Services law, which provides that a permanently neglected child:
[M]ean[s] a child who is in the care of an authorized agency and whose parent or
custodian has failed for a period of more than one year following the date such child
came into the care of an authorized agency substantially and continuously or repeatedly
to maintain contact with or plan for the future of the child, although physically and
financially able to do so, notwithstanding the agency’s diligent efforts to encourage and
strengthen the parental relationship when such efforts will not be detrimental to the
best interests of the child.
Id. at 1145.
418 See id. at 1143.
419 See id. at 1144.
420 Id. at 1140–41.
413
414
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child; assisting in planning for a child’s future; aiding in attaining a
house; or scheduling regular and meaningful visits between the
child and the parent, then the agency will be found to have satisfied
its statutory duty.421
Chief Judge Cooke noted that the agency made no attempts to
assist the father, who presented them with two separate plans to
gain custody of his child.422 In fact, the agency frustrated his
attempts and made it difficult for him to regain custody by failing to
make suitable arrangements for visits.423 Chief Judge Cooke held
that the agency acted with complete indifference to the father’s
goals, failing to satisfy its statutory obligations.424 Chief Judge
Cooke noted: “[I]t is doubtful whether it could be found to be in the
child’s best interest to deny her [parent’s] persistent demands for
custody simply because it took so long for [him] to obtain it
legally.”425
CONCLUSION
Chief Judge Cooke was not only an accomplished judge, but also a
human being of the finest caliber. He was a leader in all aspects of
life, a man of integrity, and a being of moral excellence. Chief
Judge Cooke’s legacy as a man, judge, and public leader is truly
exemplary, because:
However high he rose in public life, however powerful he
became, however long the list of his accomplishment, [he]
treated everyone, everyone, with kindness and respect. The
fact is he changed a lot of things, but some things never
changed. His hat size never changed. His concern for people
never changed, and he never deviated from his own
fundamental values. Always he took the high road.426
For his contributions as a judge, Professor Bonventre best
explained that Chief Judge Cooke will be most remembered:
[F]or his tenure on the Court of Appeals, as its foremost
guardian of individual rights, its most unrelenting opponent
of inequity, oppression, and inhumane treatment. For his
human dimension to judging.
For his sensitivity to
individual and community needs, for his commitment to
421
422
423
424
425
426

See id. at 1147, 1148.
Id. at 1149.
Id. at 1149–50.
Id. at 1150.
Id. (quoting In re Sanjivini K., 391 N.E.2d 1316, 1320 (N.Y 1979)).
Judith S. Kaye, Eulogy for Chief Judge Lawrence H. Cooke, 64 ALB. L. REV. 5, 7 (2000).
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reducing injustice, and elevating the conduct of public
officials.427
Upon his unfortunate passing on August 17, 2000,428 it was clear
that the New York State judiciary and the legal community had
been blessed to be amidst greatness.429 “He served the state
brilliantly to the very last minute, [and] to speak only from the
record books would ignore the amazing warmth he always displayed
. . . . His mission was to treat everyone equally. Always, he took the
high road.”430
Chief Judge Lawrence H. Cooke, we cherish your memory and
continue to follow your wisdom and unwavering dedication of
service to the law, your community, and the State of New York.431

Bonventre, supra note 72, at 1.
Adolfsen & Adolfsen, supra note 34.
429 See, e.g., William H. Honan, Lawrence H. Cooke, 85, New York Chief Judge, Dies, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 19, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/08/19/nyregion/lawrence-h-cooke-85new-york-chief-judge-dies.html.
430 John Emerson, County Mourns at Judge Cooke’s Funeral, SULLIVAN COUNTY DEMOCRAT
(Aug. 25, 2000), http://www.sc-democrat.com/archives/2000/news/08August/25/cooke.html.
431 As former Chief Judge Kaye expressed, Judge Cooke “wasn’t just born with the love of
his community, he earned it every single day.” Kaye, supra note 426, at 7.
427
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